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INTERROGATION WITHOUT QUESTIONS: 
RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS AND UNITED 
STATES V. HENRY 
Welsh S. White* 
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, . 
By indirections find directions out. 
Hamlet, II, i, 61-63 
The term interrogation traditionally connoted a situation in 
which police subject a suspect to something resembling the third de-
gree.1 Confined in a small room, 2 the suspect would be confronted 
by a number of police officers who would question him for long peri-
ods of time and, if necessary, seek by intimidation to wear down his 
resistance. 3 A series of cases presenting this scenario caused the 
Supreme Court to develop constitutional principles designed to curb 
coercive interrogation practices.4 
Prior to the mid-sixties, the Court used the "voluntariness" test to 
achieve this end. Under this test, the Court determined the constitu-
tional admissibility of defendants' confessions by evaluating the "to-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B 1965, 
University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I would like to thank Professor Yale Kamisar of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School and Professor Thomas Gerety of the University of Pittsburgh 
Law School for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and Anne McCarthy 
for her valuable research assistance. 
I. See, e.g., Developments in the Law - Confessions, 19 HARV. L. REV. 935, 938 (1966) 
[hereinafter cited as Developments] (noting that "[p]olice interrogation for the purpose of ob-
taining confessions • . • has been a subject of special concern in this country" at least since the 
Wickersham Commission published its report on police abuses in 1931). 
2. A detailed description of the type of room which should be "ideally" used in "interro-
gating" suspects is contained in the leading police manual. See F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMI-
NAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 10-13 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as F. INBAU & 
J. REID]. 
3. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (stripping clothes from suspect); 
Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 526 (1944) (placing a pan of the victim's bones in the suspect's 
lap); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (suspect slapped by officer who questioned hinI). 
4. See note 3 supra. See generally Developments, supra note I, at 969-83. The extent to 
which police should be allowed to question criminal suspects is the subject of prolonged, and 
continuing, dispute. Critics of police questioning rely on the accusatorial nature of our system. 
"[S]ociety carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his own 
mouth .•. but by evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Watts v. 
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). Those who have sought to limit police interrogation believe 
that interrogation, often carried out in secret, involves coercion, and often yields false confes-
sions. 
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tality of circumstances."5 The voluntariness test was inherently 
subjective; it failed to provide adequate safeguards for defendants' 
constitutional rights and forced courts to employ an elaborate and 
difficult case-by-case analysis.6 Not surprisingly, the Court sought to 
institute constitutional rules which would provide "some automatic 
device by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation 
[could] be controlled."7 Thus, in the 1964 Massiah v. United States8 
decision, the Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel 
applies to all post-indictment "interrogations," including those con-
ducted "surreptitiously,"9 and therefore, that the prosecution may 
not use incriminating statements "deliberately elicited" from an in-
dicted defendant in the absence of his counsel. 10 And in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 11 decided in 1966, the Court held that the "prosecution may 
not use statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the 
defrendant" unless it demonstrates that the defendant has waived the 
rights specified in Miranda and guaranteed to him by the fifth 
amendment. 12 These decisions afforded suspects significant protec-
tion against overtly coercive techniques of interrogation. 
More recently, police interrogation tactics have become less 
overtly coercive. In part, this change may be attributed to the in-
creasingly stringent constitutional limitations developed by the 
Court. 13 But perhaps more importantly, the change has occurred be-
5. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315 (1959). 
6. See generally Kamisar, A .Dissent from the Miranda .Dissents: Some Comments on the 
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966), re-
printed in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: EsSAYS IN LAW AND 
POLICY 41-76 (1980) [hereinefier cited without cross-reference as KAMISAR EssAYS]; Kamisar, 
What is an Involuntary Co,!fession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interroga-
tion and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in KAMISAR EsSAYS 1-40; 
.Developments, supra note I. 
7. W. SCHAFFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 10 (1967). 
8. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
9. 377 U.S. at 206. In formulating the issue in Massiah, the Court did not use the term 
"interrogation" but rather asked whether the "deliberate elicitation" of statements violated the 
defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights. 377 U.S. at 204. However, in resolving that 
issue the Court did use the term "interrogation" to characterize the type of police conduct 
prohibited by the Massiah rule. 377 U.S. at 206 (quoting the lower courts dissenting opinion 
of Judge Hays, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73). For an illuminating discussion of the relationship (or lack 
ofit) between "interrogation" under Miranda and the rule developed by the Court in Massiah, 
see Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? Wiren 
.Does it Matter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 41-44 (1978), reprinted in KAMISAR EssAYS 175-78, 
10. 377 U.S. at 206. 
1 I. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
12. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). 
13. Aside from the protections developed in Miranda and Massiah, the Court's post-1960 
''voluntariness" test was undoubtedly more protective of suspects' rights than the Court's ear-
lier version of the same test. Compare, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (ex-
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cause police are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their ap-
proaches to interrogation. Leading police manuals today reflect an 
awareness that the high-pressure browbeating practices of the past 
are less likely to be effective than subtler, more psychologically ori-
ented tactics, 14 including some that involve no direct questioning of 
the suspect at all. 15 
Because of this change in police strategy, developing a definition 
of "interrogation" assumes particular importance. During this past 
term, the Supreme Court specifically addressed this problem by de-
fining "interrogation" in the two contexts where, for constitutional 
purposes, that definition is crucial. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 16 the 
Court defined "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda; and 
in United States v. Henry, 11 it defined "deliberate elicitation" within 
the meaning of Massiah. This article explores the implications of 
Innis and Henry, suggests readings of the new tests consistent with 
tp.eir purposes, and applies the tests to several situations where the 
scope of the fifth and sixth amendment protections remains unclear. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO INNIS AND HENRY 
Although in one sense Innis and Henry are refinements of Mi-
randa and Massiah, respectively, the more immediate progenitor of 
both decisions is Brewer v. Williams. 18 Although the 1977 Williams 
decision did not purport to define interrogation, the Supreme Court's 
analysis raised troubling questions about the definition of interroga-
tion under both Miranda and Massiah.1 9 In deciding both Innis and 
Henry in a single term, the Court achieved an unusual symmetry in 
its interrogation opinions by addressing both of the troubling issues 
raised but not resolved in Williams. Since Innis and Henry may be 
press threat of incommunicado detention and conditioning communication with family upon 
signing confession violates defendant's due process rights) with Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 
(1958) (state denial of a defendant's request to confer with counsel during police questioning 
does not violate defendant's due process rights). See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 
938. 
14. See, e.g., R. ROYAL & s. SCHUTI, GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGA-
TION 61-62 (1976) (emphasizing that to lower the suspect's resistance to disclosing incriminat-
. ing information, police should "[e]stablish confidence and friendliness by talking for a period 
about everyday subjects"); F. INBAU AND J. REID, supra note 2, at 20 (emphasizing the impor-
tance of treating the suspect with "decency and respect" in order to establish a better rapport). 
15. See, e.g., the "Christian burial speech" utilized by Detective Leaming in Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). For a discussion of the Williams case, see text at notes 21-45 
infra. 
16. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980). 
17. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). 
18. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
19. For a thorough discussion of these questions, see KAMISAR EsSAYS at 140-88. 
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viewed as the immediate offspring of Williams, an attempt to evalu-
ate their significance must begin with a brief review of the Williams 
case.20 
A. Brewer v. Williams 
On Christmas Eve, 1968, a ten-year-old girl disappeared while 
attending a wrestling tournament with her family in Des Moines, 
Iowa.21 Robert Williams, a deeply religious person22 who had re-
cently escaped from a mental hospital, was suspected of her abduc-
tion and murder. A warrant was issued for his arrest. After a 
telephone conversation with his attorney, Williams surrendered to 
officers in Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles east of Des Moines.23 
After Williams was arraigned before a judge in Davenport, Cap-
tain Leaming and another Des Moines officer arrived to transport 
the suspect by police car to Des Moines.24 Before this trip began, 
Williams was advised of his Miranda rights by both the judge and 
Captain Leaming. Williams asserted his right to counsel,25 and a 
Davenport attorney and the Des Moines police entered into an 
agreement that the police ''would not question him during the 
trip."26 Shortly after the trip began, Captain Leaming delivered the 
now famous "Christian burial speech,"27 in which, as recounted by 
the Supreme Court, he began by addressing Williams as "Reverend" 
and continued: 
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling 
down the road . . .. Number one, I want you to observe the weather 
conditions, it's raining, it's sleeting, it's freezing, driving is very treach-
erous, visibility is poor, it's going to be dark early this evening. They 
are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you 
yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is, 
that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on 
20. Professor Kamisar's penetrating analysis of both the Williams record, see Kamisar, 
Foreword· Brewer v. Williams -A Hard Look al a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 
(1977), reprinted in KAMISAR EsSAYS 113-37, and the Court's opinions, see KAMISAR EsSAYS 
139-224, makes it unnecessary to discuss the case at length here. 
21. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 (1977). 
22. 430 U.S. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring). 
23. 430 U.S. at 390. 
24. 430 U.S. at 391. 
25. Williams retained counsel in both Des Moines and Davenport and consulted with both 
attorneys. During the trip back to Des Moines, Williams told Detective Leaming that he 
would reveal the whole story efter he consulted with his attorney in Des Moines. 430 U.S. at 
390-92 (emphasis added). See generally KAMISAR EssAYS at 140. 
26. 430 U.S. at 391. 
27. Professor Kamisar's examination of the Williams record shows that Detective Leaming 
testified to two different versions of the "Christian burial speech." See KAMISAR EssAYS at 
117-19. ' 
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top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be 
going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we 
could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should 
be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched 
away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we 
should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morn-
ing and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not 
being able to find it at all.28 
Williams asked the detective why he thought their route to Des 
Moines would take them past the girl's body, and Leaming re-
sponded that he knew the body was near Mitchellville - a town 
they would be passing on the way to Des Moines. Leaming then 
stated, "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it 
any further. Just think about it as we're riding down the road."29 
When the car reached Mitchellville, Williams directed the officers to 
the girl's body.30 
The Supreme Court held that Williams's statements in response 
to the "Christian burial speech" were constitutionally inadmissible.31 
The basis for the Court's decision was in itself significant. Although 
both lower courts that ruled in the defendant's favor had rested their 
decision32 on a holding that defendant's statements were obtained in 
violation of fifth amendment rights guaranteed by Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 33 the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to apply Miranda.34 
Instead, it found that Williams's statements were obtained in viola-
tion of his sixth amendment right to an attorney.35 Following estab-
lished precedent,36 the majority found that the sixth amendment 
right was applicable because formal charges had been initiated 
against the defendant. 37 However, the Court went on to emphasize 
that no sixth amendment "protection would come into play if there 
had been no interrogation."38 After carefully analyzing Detective 
Learning's "Christian burial speech," the Court concluded that the 
"speech" was "tantamount to interrogation" because it was clear that 
in making it, the Detective "deliberately and designedly set out to 
28. 430 U.S. at 392-93. 
29. 430 U.S. at 392-93. 
30. 430 U.S. at 393. 
31. 430 U.S. at 406. 
32. For a discussion of the lower court opinions, see KAMISAR EssAYS at 166-69. 
33. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
34. 430 U.S. at 397. 
35. 430 U.S. at 397-98. 
36. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
37. 430 U.S. at 398-99. 
38. 430 U.S. at 400. 
, , 
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elicit information from Williams just as surely as - perhaps more 
effectively than - if he had formally interrogated him."39 The 
Court thus justified its conclusion that the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel was violated.40 
Despite this result, the Williams analysis raised troubling ques-
tions for those who believe police interrogation practices should be 
curbed by strict constitutional rules. First, the Court's refusal to 
ground its decision on Miranda, despite the fact that both lower 
courts had done so, raised questions as to the continued scope, and 
perhaps even the continued vitality, of Miranda.41 Moreover, the 
Court's intimation that the defendant's sixth amendment right pre-
cluded only "interrogation," together with its detailed explanation of 
why the "Christian burial speech" constituted "interrogation," sug-
gested that the Williams definition of the sixth amendment right was 
narrower than that recognized by Massiah.42 In addition, the four 
dissenting Justices vehemently argued for an even more restrictive 
interpretation of the defendant's constitutional protections;43 and at 
least one of the concurring justices44 intimated that his decision to 
join the majority decision and opinion may have been influenced by 
his conclusion that the state had "dishOJ?-Ored" a promise made by it 
to the defendant's attomey.45 Thus, as a result of Williams, the scope 
of both fifth amendment Miranda rights and a defendant's sixth 
amendment right to an attorney under Massiah were thrown into 
question. The two cases decided last term shed light on both of these 
important issues. 
39. 430 U.S. at 399 & n.6. 
40. 430 U.S. at 400. 
41. See KAMISAR EssAYS at 201-02: "[T]he Court's avoidance of Miranda is at least puz-
zling and at worst (for supporters of Miranda, at any rate) downright ominous." 
42. See text at notes 38-39 supra. In United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly accepted this position, holding that the Williams 
gloss upon Massiah precludes a finding that Massiah is violated by "deliberate secret listening 
on the part of the government." In concluding that defendant's statements, monitored and 
recorded by electronic surveillance, were not obtained in violation of the sixth amendment, the 
court emphasized that "under Massiah, as interpreted by Brewer, there was no violation of 
appellant's sixth amendment right. . . because there was no interrogation of her - either 
formally or surreptitiously - by the government." 563 F.2d at 1348. 
43. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); 430 U.S. at 
429 (White, J., dissenting); 430 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of 
some of the issues raised by these opinions, see KAMISAR EssAYS at 142-51. 
44. While joining the majority's opinion, three justices also wrote separate concurring 
opinions. See 430 U.S. at 406 (Marshall, J., concurring); 430 U.S. at 409 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); 430 U.S. at 414 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
45. 430 U.S. at 415 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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B. Rhode Island v. Innis 
On January 16, 1975, authorities discovered the body of John 
Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island, taxicab driver who had been 
killed by a shotgun blast to the back of his head.46 On January 17, 
just after midnight, another taxicab driver reported that he had just 
been robbed-by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun and that he had 
dropped the man off in the Mount Pleasant area of Providence. At 
4:30 that morning, Thomas Innis was arrested in the Mount Pleasant 
area. At the time of his arrest, Innis was unarmed. 47 
Within a few minutes, a large number of police officers con-
verged on the scene. At least three different officers testified that 
they gave Innis his Miranda warnings.48 When Captain Leyden, 
who was apparently in charge of the investigation, informed him of 
his rights under Miranda, Innis responded that "he understood those 
rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer."49 Captain Leyden then 
directed that Innis be placed in a "caged wagon" ( a four-door police 
car with a wire screen mesh between the front and rear seats) and 
driven to the central police station. Captain Leyden assigned three 
officers - Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna - to ac-
company Innis in the wagon; he instructed the officers not to ques-
tion, intimidate, or coerce Innis during the ride to headquarters.50 
The officers in the wagon did not directly question the defendant; 
however, soon after they left the scene of the arrest, Officer Gieck-
man engaged in a conversation with Officer McKenna, during which 
he stated that ''there's a lot of handicapped children running around 
in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with 
shells and they might hurt themselves."51 Upon overhearing this 
conversation, the defendant said to the officers, "Stop, turn around, 
I'll show you where it is."52 The caged wagon then returned to the 
scene of the arrest where, after having been warned once again of his 
constitutional rights, the defendant directed the police to the location 
of the murder weapon.53 Innis's incriminating statements and the 
46. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1686 (1980). 
47. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. 
48. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. 
49. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. 
50. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. 
51. 100 S. Ct. at 1686. Officer Williams's recollection of the conversation was similar to, 
but not exactly the same as, Officer Gleckman's. Willi:ams apparently recalled Gleckman also 
stating, "It would be too bad if the little . . . girl . . . would pick up the gun, maybe kill 
herself." 100 S. Ct. at 1686. 
52. 100 S. Ct. at 1687. 
53. 100 S. Ct. at 1687. 
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murder weapon were introduced as evidence at his trial on murder, 
kidnapping, and robbery charges. He was convicted on all three 
counts. 
In reversing Innis's murder conviction, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that his Miranda rights had been violated be-
cause the officers' "dangerous weapon conversation" constituted "in-
terrogation" of Innis at the time when "interrogation" was 
prohibited.54 The court did not articulate any clear definition of "in-
terrogation"; however, it rejected the prosecutor's claims that the 
conversation was not "interrogation" either because it was prompted 
by a legitimate concern for public safety or becal).se Innis was not 
personally addressed by the officers. The essence of the lower court's 
analysis was that, as a result of the conversation, Innis "underwent 
the same psychological pressures which moved Williams to lead po-
lice to the body of his victim."55 In the court's view, Innis was inter-
rogated within the meaning of Miranda because 
police officers in such a situation must not be permitted to achieve indi-
rectly, by talking with one another, a result which the Supreme Court 
has said they may not achieve directly by talking to a suspect who has 
been ordered not to respond. The same "subtle compulsion" exists.56 
Thus, the lower court essentially reasoned that police practices which 
are "tantamount to interrogation" within the meaning of Brewer v. 
Williams will also constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of 
Miranda. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's state-
ments and the shotgun found as a result of the statements were inad-
missible. 57 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stewart's 
opinion began by identifying the issue in the case as ''whether [Innis] 
was 'interrogated' by the police officers in violation of [his] undis-
puted right under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted 
with a lawyer."58 The Court then proceeded to define "interroga-
tion" within the meaning of Miranda. While. conceding that por-
tions of the Miranda opinion appeared to equate "interrogation" 
with direct "questioning," the Court found that Miranda's concern 
with the coercive effect of police tactics not involving direct ques-
tioning necessitated a finding that "the Miranda safeguards come 
54. See State v. Innis, - R.I. -, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978). 
55. - R.I. at-, 391 A.2d at 1162. 
56. - R.I. at-, 391 A.2d at 1162. 
57. See-R.I. at-, 391 A.2d at 1164. In excluding the evidence, the Court also held that 
despite the additional warning to Innis of his constitutional rights, see text at note 60 supra, 
Innis did not validly waive his rights under Miranda. - R.I. at -, 391 A.2d at 1163-64. 
58. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688 (1980). 
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into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express 
questioning or its functional equivalent."59 The Court refined this 
analysis in the following rule: 
"[I]nterrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express question-
ing, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ( other 
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 
from the suspect. 60 
Before applying this test to the facts of Innis, the C~mrt dropped a 
footnote which added that even though the rule's focus is not on the 
"underlying intent of the police,"61 the intent of the police will be 
relevant because "where a police practice is designed to elicit an in-
criminating response from the accused it is unlikely that the practice 
will not also be one which the police should have known was reason-
ably likely to have that effect."62 
The Court then succinctly applied its test to the facts of Innis. 
Justice Stewart emphasized that, to the police, Innis did not appear 
to have any special characteristics. Thus, nothing in the record 
would suggest that the officers ''were aware that [Innis] was pecu-
liarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety 
of handicapped children," or that they "knew that [he] was unusu-
ally disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest."63 Justice Stewart 
also noted that the conversation was short, and not particularly 
"evocative";64 in a footnote, he added that there was no basis for 
concluding that "the officers' remarks were designed to elicit a re-
sponse."65 On the basis of this analysis, the Court concluded that the 
"dangerous weapon conversation" did not constitute "interrogation" 
within the meaning of Miranda. It found, that while Innis may have 
been subjected to "subtle coercion" in the sense that the "officers' 
comments struck a responsive chord" which produced an incriminat-
ing response, the response was not a product of words or conduct 
that the police "should have known were reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response."66 
59. 100 S. Ct. at 1688-89. 
60. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 (footnotes omitted). 
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1690. 
62. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7. 
63. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 (footnote omitted). 
64. 100 S. Ct. at 1691: 
65. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9 (emphasis in o~ginal). 
66. 100 S. Ct. at 1691. 
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C. United States v. Henry 
After his indictment on a federal bank robbery charge, Billy Gale 
Henry was incarcerated in the Norfolk City Jail.67 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Edward Nichols, a prisoner who had been a paid informant of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation for over a year, informed an FBI 
agent that he was in the same cell-block as Henry. The agent told 
Nichols to be alert to any statements Henry made but also warned 
him that he should not "initiate conversation with or question 
Henry" about the bank robbery.68 Nichols later reported that Henry 
had engaged him in conversation and made incriminating statements 
concerning how the robbery had occurred.69 The FBI paid Nichols 
for furnishing this information.70 At Henry's trial, Nichols testified 
to Henry's incriminating statements.71 Henry was convicted and 
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the use of Nichols's testi-
mony violated Henry's sixth amendment right to counsel.72 The 
court assumed that Nichols obeyed the FBI agent's instructions not 
to question Henry about the bank robbery, but nevertheless held that 
Nichols's act of "engaging the defendant in a general conversation" 
would constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Massiah and 
Brewer v. Wi/!iams.13 Accordingly, Henry's admissions to Nichols 
were ruled constitutionally inadmissible. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit decision. In an 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Burger, the·Court refused the gov-
ernment's invitation to reconsider the vitality of the Massiah doc-
trine.74 Instead, it identified the issue before it as "whether under the 
facts of this case, a government agent 'deliberately elicited' incrimi-
nating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah."15 In 
67. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2184 (1980). 
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2184. 
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2183-84, 2184 n.2. 
70. 100 S. Ct. at 2185. An affidavit submitted by the FBI agent further disclosed that 
"Nichols had been paid by the FBI for expenses and services in connection with information 
he had provided" as an informant for over a year. 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.7. From this affidavit, 
Chief Justice Burger deduced that the "arrangement between Nichols and the agent was on a 
contingent fee basis." However, this finding, disputed b_y the dissent, 100 S. Ct. at 2193-95 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), did not appear central to the Court's analysis. 
71. 100 S. Ct. at 2184. Although affidavits relating to the instructions given by the FBI to 
Nichols were filed in the district court, 100 S. Ct. at 2185-86, neither Nichols nor Henry ever 
testified about how the conversations in which Henry's incriminating statements occurred de-
veloped. 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.8. 
72. United States v. Henry, 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978). 
73. 590 F.2d at 547. 
74. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2187-88 (1980). 
75. 100 S. Ct. at 2186. 
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support of its affirmative conclusion, the Court emphasized first that 
Nichols was a government agent76 who appeared to Henry to be a 
fellow prisoner and second that Henry was in custody during the 
conversation.77 The Court expressed the view that both Nichols's 
failure to disclose his true identity and Henry's confinement in 
prison increased the likelihood of an incriminating statement. The 
government's deceit makes the defendant unaware "that his state-
ments may be used against him";78 and the defendant's "confine-
ment may bring into play subtle influences that will make him 
particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover governmental 
agents."79 
Nevertheless, the Court did not hold that the combination of 
these factors was in itself sufficient to preclude Nichols from testify-
ing as to any statements made by Henry while in prison. Rather, in 
a footnote, the Chief Justice reserved judgment on the "situation 
where an informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort 
to stimulate conversations about the crime charged."80 As Justice 
Blackmun noted in his dissent,81 distinguishing this situation from 
Henry is difficult because in Henry no determination was ever made 
as to how the conversation between the informer and the defendant 
developed.82 For all that appears in the record, Henry could have 
initiated the conversation, and he may have made some of his in-
criminating statements before Nichols had commented at all upon 
criminal activity.83 Although the majority's treatment ofthis aspect 
of the case was not entirely clear,84 its conclusion that Nichols's con-
duct was sufficient to trigger the sixth amendment protection85 was 
apparently based on findings that Henry's incriminating statements 
76. 100 S. Ct. at 2186-87. 
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2186. 
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
79. 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.9. In the same footnote, the Court also reserved judgment on the 
case where "an inanimate electronic device" or electronic listening post is used to record an 
indicted suspect's incriminating statements. 
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2190 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
82. 100 S. Ct. at 2195-96. See note 71 supra. 
83. 100 S. Ct. at 2195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "[i]t may well be that Henry first let the 
cat out of the bag, either by volunteering statements or by inadvertently discussing the crime 
with someone else within ear-shot of Nichols." 
84. Some of the confusion results because the majority does not clarify the extent to which 
the government will be accountable for conduct by Nichols which was neither expressly nor 
impliedly authorized by it. See 100 S. Ct. at 2193 n.8. For further discussion of this issue, see 
note 182 infra. 
85. By reserving judgment on the "listening post" cases, see note 80 supra and accompany-
ing text, the Court indicated that some type of affirmative conduct by Nichols was necessary to 
its holding. See also 100 S. Ct. at 2190 (Powell, J., concurring): "I could not join the Court's 
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were "the product" of his conversations with Nichols and that 
Henry's later request that Nichols assist in escape plans demon-
strated that during the critical conversations "Nichols had managed 
to gain the confidence of Henry."86 Accordingly, based on its analy-
sis of the relevant facts, the Court concluded that the government 
violated Henry's sixth amendment right to counsel because it "inten-
tionally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to make incrimi-
nating statements without the assistance of counsel."87 
D. The Immediate Impact ef Innis and Henry 
Measured against the negative expectations created by Brewer v. 
Wi!!iams,88 the Henry decision has properly been viewed as surpris-
ingly supportive of defendants' sixth amendment rights. 89 And while 
Innis has been criticized by some commentators,90 it can be inter-
preted as supporting the fundamental goals of Miranda. 
In some respects, the Henry decision was more liberal, and more 
surprising, than Innis. Despite Wil!iams's intimation that Massiah's 
applicability might be narrowed,91 Henry not only reaffirmed Mas-
siah92 but extended it to some degree by applying it to a situation 
where there was no showing that a government agent did anything 
designed to elicit incriminating remarks.93 Moreover, Chief Justice 
Burger's switch from an apparently outraged dissenter in Wl1!iams94 
opinion if it held that the mere presence or incidental conversation of an informant in a jail 
cell would violate Massiah." 
86. 100 S. Ct. at 2189. 
87. 100 S. Ct. at 2189. 
88. See text at notes 41-45 supra. 
89. See N.Y. Times, June 22, 1980, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 8, col. 4 (quoting com• 
mentators characterizing the Henry result as "remarkable"). 
The result was evidently described as "remarkable" for several reasons. After the Supreme 
Court's decision in Miranda, the Massiah holding was in eclipse. But the combination of 
Brewer v. Williams and the Henry decision reinvigorated the Massiah doctrine. Notably, in 
the Henry decision, the Court declined to attempt to limit Massiah to its facts. And the Court 
in Henry also passed up an opportunity to distinguish Henry from Massiah on the ground that 
no counsel had been appointed for Herny at the time incriminating statements were elicited 
from him. Thus the revival of Massiah, and Chief Justice Burger's surprising authorship of the 
majority opinion in Henry, contribute to the "remarkable" nature of this decision. 
90. Two articles published soon after Innis was handed down question whether the Court's 
introduction oflanguage that looks to the apparent probability that police speech will elicit an 
incriminating response undercuts the efforts to limit surreptitious police interrogation. See, 
e.g., Welsh and Collins, A Two-Faced Approach to Miranda, Natl. L.J., June 16, 1980, at 15, 
col. I; Klement, Miranda Loophole Seen in Supreme Court Ruling, Natl. L.J., May 26, 1980, at 
11, col. I. 
91. See text at note 42 supra. 
92. The Court specifically rejected the government's contention that Williams "modified 
Massiah's 'deliberately elicited' test." United States v. Herny, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2187 (1980). 
93. For further elaboration of this point, see text at notes 171-76 infta. 
94. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415 (1977) ("[t]he result in this case ought 
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to the author of the majority opinion in Henry seems especially puz-
zling. Granted, the Henry case differed from Williams in that it in-
volved clear government deceit.95 Nevertheless, it is strange that the 
Justice who found it "most remarkable" that the "Christian burial 
speech" could violate Massiah "simply because it [was] followed by 
an incriminating disclosure"96 was willing to find that Nichols's 
"conversations" with Henry violated Massiah merely because Nich-
ols "managed to gain the confidence" of the defendant.97 The result 
in Henry, the Chief Justice's surprising shift from Williams, and the 
extension of Massiah all mark the Henry decision as strengthening 
defendants' sixth amendment rights. 
The immediate holding in Innis appears somewhat less favorable 
to Miranda rights than Henry was to Massiah rights. Yet despite its 
result, the Innis case should provide considerable comfort for sup-
porters of Miranda. First, it is noteworthy that the vehement chal-
lenges of the four dissenting Justices in Williams were never 
broached in Innis.98 Perhaps most significantly, the Court's unhap-
to be intolerable in any society which purports to call itself an organized society"); 430 U.S. at 
4 l 6-17 ("the Court regresses to playing a grisly game of 'hide and seek,' once more exalting the 
sporting theory of criminal justice"); 430 U.S. at 417 ("I categorically reject the remarkable 
notion that the police in this case were guilty of unconstitutional conduct or any conduct justi-
fying the bizarre result reached by the Court"). 
95. The element of deceit eliminates the argument which was elaborated by Justice White 
in his Williams dissent. See note 101 infra. Since the suspect is not aware that he is dealing 
with a government agent, it is impossible to argue that the suspect is waiving his sixth amend-
ment rights by voluntarily disclosing information at a time when he knows or should know 
that the effect of this disclosure will be a relinquishment of his constitutional protection. See 
United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
96. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 419-20 (1977). 
97. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (1980). 
98. In addition, drawing upon views expressed in a previous dissent authored by Justice 
White and joined by Justice Stewart, the Innis majority could have held that Miranda does not 
apply when the defendant is in a police car because the custodial atmosphere present at the 
police station is lacking. Mirandds express definition of the term "custody" would include a 
situation where an arrested defendant is confined in a police car. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his 
freedom of action in any significant way") (footnote omitted). However, in explaining the 
coercion produced by "'custodial interrogation," Miranda focused exclusively upon the effect 
of police questioning and of tactics utilized at the station-house. As Professor Grano has 
noted, "[t]he station-house is unique not only in its isolation of the defendant but also in the 
interrogation procedures it permits." Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need 10 Reconsider the 
Constilulional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. l, 46-47 
(1979). Of course, in the 1969 decision of Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the Warren 
Court applied Miranda to exclude a defendant's statement in a situation where he was arrested 
and interrogated in his own home; however, in dissent, Justice White joined by Justice Stewart 
protested that the ruling "ignores the purpose of Miranda to guard against what was thought to 
be the corrosive influence of practices which station-house interrogation makes feasible." 394 
U.S. at 329 (White, J., dissenting). The Innis majority's failure to refer to the point raised by 
the Orozco dissent indicates that the application of Miranda cannot be confined to the station-
house. 
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piness with the Miranda exclusionary rule appears to have subsided. 
Even Chief Justice Burger, who strongly urged in his Williams dis-
sent that the exclusionary rule should never be applied to exclude 
voluntary confessions obtained as a result of "non-egregious police 
conduct,"99 was content to say that he ''would neither overrule 
Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." 100 For the mo-
ment at least, it appears that the Miranda decision is here to stay.101 
Moreover, in at least some respects, the Innis majority's analysis 
constitutes a surprisingly broad construction of Miranda. One possi-
ble reading of the Court's failure to apply Miranda to the facts of 
Williams was that "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda 
was defined so narrowly that it would not include tactics like the 
"Christian burial speech."102 But under the facts of Williams, this 
could only mean that the Court was prepared to construe Miranda 
"interrogation" quite narrowly indeed. The Williams majority rec-
ognized that in using the "Christian burial speech," "Detective 
99. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
100. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1691 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
101. Two other approaches suggested by dissenting Justices in Williams were also appar-
ently abandoned in Innis. Based on Justice White's dissent in Brewer, Innis could have been 
decided in the government's favor on the ground that, whether or not the "dangerous weapon 
conversation" constituted "interrogation,'' the defendant waived his rights under Miranda. 
After having been given the Miranda warnings prior to the conversation, it could be argued, 
the suspect was certainly aware that he was relinquishing his right to remain silent when he 
disclosed the location of the shotgun. The premise of this analysis is that "the right involved in 
Miranda ... [is] a right not to answer any questions" as opposed to "a right not to be asked 
any questions" in the absence of a waiver given "before the questions are asked." Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 436 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). While noting 
his preference for this line of analysis, Justice White nevertheless stated that as a result of the 
decision and opinion in Williams, he was joining the Innis majority opinion. Justice White's 
conclusion that Williams precluded his preferred line of analysis in a case involving a Miranda 
issue is somewhat curious because in Williams he wrote that the majority was rejecting his 
analysis because the case involved a sixth amendment issue rather than a Miranda one, 430 
U.S. at 436 (White, J., dissenting). 
In addition, Innis could have been decided in favor of the government because police state-
ments or questions prompted by a legitimate concern for protecting public safety cannot con-
stitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. The seeds for such a rationale were 
planted in Justice Blackmun's Williams dissent when he suggested that Detective Learning's 
"Christian burial speech" did not violate the sixth amendment because "Learning's purpose 
was not solely to obtain incriminating evidence." 430 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
However, the Innis majority, which included Justice Blackmun and the two other Justices who 
joined his dissent in Williams, specifically eschewed an approach which would determine 
whether the police complied with Miranda solely on the basis of an inquiry into their purpose 
or intent. Thus, despite lower case authority to the contrary, see, e.g., cases cited in notes 154 
& 155 infra, the majority's analysis appears to validate Professor Kamisar's conclusion that 
police statements which otherwise IJlla!!fy as interrogation do not become something else solely 
because the interrogator's primary purpose was something other than the procuring of incrimi-
nating statements. See KAMISAR EssAYS at 146. For further discussion of the bearing police 
purpose will have in determining whether their statements or conduct constitute "interroga-
tion," see text at notes 142-65 i,ifra. 
102. See KAMISAR EsSAYS at 204-09. 
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Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information just 
as surely as - and perhaps more effectively than - if he had for-
mally interrogated him."103 Thus, if the "Christian burial speech" 
would not constitute "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, 
the definition of such "interrogation" would almost inevitably be 
limited to situations in which police directly question defendants. 
In Innis the Court explicitly disavowed this limited definition of 
"interrogation"104 and ruled instead that in view of the purposes of 
Miranda, 105 "interrogation" must be construed to include words or 
conduct that are the "functional equivalent" of direct questioning. 
This broad construction of Miranda affords suspects greater protec-
tion than that granted by some lower courts before Innis because it is 
now clear that "interrogation" can take place even when the police 
speech is not punctuated by a question mark, 106 nor directly ad-
dressed to the suspect. Moreover, it is also clear that "interrogation" 
now includes police tactics which do not even involve speech. Nev-
ertheless, despite the Court's seemingly broad reading of Miranda, 
the Innis test is ambiguous. Under one interpretation, the test con-
tains a fl.aw which could lead to expanded use of coercive tactics by 
the police. The next section of this Article examines the inexact lan-
guage of the Innis decision and suggests interpretations of both Innis 
and Henry that are consistent with the Court's apparent intentions. 
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE INNIS AND HENRY TESTS 
To gauge the protections afforded by Innis and Henry accurately, 
it is necessary to inquire into the precise meaning of the two tests 
articulated by the Court. Part of this inquiry must delve into the 
"rigidity" or clarity of the tests. As Justice Rehnquist has stated, in 
establishing rules relating to police efforts to elicit incriminating 
statements, "rigidity'' is a "core virtue."107 Thus, the Miranda "deci-
sion's rigidity has afforded police clear guidance on the acceptable 
103. 430 U.S. at 399. 
104. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1688 (1980). 
105. 100 S. Ct. at 1688, 1689. 
106. Prior to Innis, several lower court cases implicitly held that "interrogation" cannot 
occur in the absence of direct police questioning. See, e.g., Phillips v. Attorney General, 594 
F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant's inculpatory statement made after police indi-
cated they suspected him of transporting marijuana held admissible because volunteered on 
defendant's own initiative and not in response to police interrogation); United States v. Rieves, 
584 F.2d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 1978) (agent's comment to suspect that he would inform court of 
any cooperation on suspect's part did not constitute interrogation). See generally Project: 
Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 68 GEO. L.J. 279, 364 n.673 (1979). 
107. Fare v. Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., on application for stay) 
(calling "rigidity'' of Miranda its "core virtue"). · 
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manner of questioning an accused. It has allowed courts to avoid the 
intractable factual determinations that the former totality of the cir-
cumstances approach often entailed."108 Accordingly, in determin-
ing whether the tests articulated by Innis and Henry are consistent 
with the Miranda and Massiah doctrines from which they spring, 
this Article will evaluate the extent to which the tests provide clear 
guidance for the police and lower courts.109 
A. Innis's "Reasonably Likely to Elicit" Test 
In Innis, the Supreme Court defined interrogation as including 
police tactics "that the police should know are reasonably likely to 
evoke an incriminating response from a suspect."110 This new defi-
nition of "interrogation" is not free of ambiguity. While the focus of 
the inquiry is objective, looking to the situation as it would be 
viewed by an objective observer in the position of the officer rather 
than as it actually appeared to either the officer or the suspect, 111 the 
test articulated by the Court does not in itself define a clear substan-
tive standard. At le~st two important issues need clarification. How 
likely is "reasonably likely?" And what factors should be weighed in 
determining whether the requisite degree of "likelihood" is present? 
The extent to which differing answers to these questions may alter 
the majority's rule - and the clarity of guidance it affords police -
is illustrated by the widely divergent views of the rule expressed by 
the dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and Marshall. 
Justice Stevens's view of the Innis majority's test seems to be that 
it looks to the apparent probability that police speech or conduct will 
elicit an incriminating response. 112 If this interpretation of the ma-
jority's rule is accurate, Innis will result in a new form of balancing 
test under which courts would weigh all the circumstances known to 
the police to determine whether the apparent probability of an in-
108. Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980). 
109. Cf. Stone, The Miranda .Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. RBV. 99, 136-37 
(criticizing the "scrupulously honor'' test developed by the Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96 (1975), on the ground that it "offers only ambiguous protection to the accused and 
virtually no guidance to the police or the courts who must live with the rule"). 
110. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 (1980). 
11 I. Of course, the objective observer must take into account any special characteristics of 
the suspect which are known to the police. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1690. This 
type of objective focus seems appropriate if only because it is impossible to ascertain the actual 
state of mind of either the officer or the suspect. For an elaboration of this point, see White, 
Rhode Island v. Innis: The Sign!ficance oJ a Suspecl's Assertion oJ His Righi lo Counsel, 17 AM, 
CRIM. L. REv. 53, 66-67 (1979). 
112. See 100 S. Ct. at 1695 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that the Court's 
definition will not apply to situations in which police attempt to elicit incriminating statements 
but have little "reason to believe their efforts are likely to be successful"). 
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criminating response is high enough to be characterized as "reason-
ably likely." Interpreted in this way, the Innis test would fail 
miserably in serving its function of providing adequate guidance to 
police and lower courts. Aside from the problem of deciding what 
degree of likelihood is "reasonably likely," the amorphousness of 
this interpretation of the Innis standard results from the difficulty of 
determining the weight to be given factors arguably related to the 
suspect's likelihood of resistance. Moreover, courts could easily ap-
ply the standard so as to allow rather wide leeway to the police. In 
Innis itself, for example, a court properly could consider that Innis 
appeared to be a cold-blooded killer, 113 that he knew he was under 
arrest for a serious crime, 114 that he had been informed several times 
thathis statements made could be used against him, and that he had 
indicated that he did not want to divulge information unless an at-
torney was present. 115 Taking all of these factors into account, a 
court applying the Stevens interpretation of the majority's test could 
justify the result in Innis on the ground that a cold-blooded killer 
who apparently knew that any information he gave the police would 
enhance the chances of his conviction would be unlikely to respond 
to the type of appeal to conscience contained in Officer Gleckman's 
remarks. 
Indeed, if the Innis test is interpreted as focusing on apparent 
probabilities, the result in Innis itself seems relatively straightfor-
ward. If such an interpretation prevails, the government will be in a 
position to argue for admission of statements resulting from far more 
insidious police practices than those involved in Innis. Two hypo-
thetical variations of the Williams case will illustrate. It will be re-
called that in Williams itself the police knew that the defendant was 
mentally ill (he had escaped from a mental institution) and deeply 
religious. In addition, the defendant had been advised of his 
Miranda rights many times, 116 had asserted them on numerous occa-
sions, 117 and was represented by two attorneys while he was being 
transported from Davenport to Des Moines. 118 Finally, the defen-
113. At least, the police knew that Innis was the likely recent possessor of a shotgun used 
to kill a taxicab driver by shooting him in the back of the head. See text at notes 46-47 supra. 
114. The number of officers converging on the scene of the arrest, see text at note 48 supra, 
would in itself have put Innis on notice of the seriousness of the charges against him. Whether 
Innis was informed that he was under arrest for robbery, murder, or both is not clear from the 
record. 
115. See text at note 49 supra. 
116. See KAMISAR EsSAYS at 139-40. 
117. See id. at 140. 
118. See id. at 139-40. 
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dant had been arraigned prior to the trip. 119 In the first variation of 
Williams considered below, the facts are identical to those in the ac-
tual Williams case except that the defendant is not arraigned or rep-
resented by counsel before the trip to Des Moines. The facts of the 
second variation are identical to those of the first except that there is 
no indication in the record that the defendant has any mental 
problems, any special anxieties, 120 or any particular inclination to-
ward religion. 
The first variation differs from the actual Williams case only in 
that, because judicial proceedings have not commenced before the 
trip and the sixth amendment is not applicable, 121 the case must be 
decided on the basis of Miranda. 122 In this situation, a court would 
have to decide an issue side-stepped in Williams - whether the 
"Christian burial speech" constituted "interrogation" within the 
meaning of Miranda. 123 Even if the Innis test is read as focusing 
upon the "apparent probability" of the defendant's response, the de-
fendant has a strong argument in favor of characterizing the "Chris-
tian burial speech" as "interrogation." Because Detective Leaming 
knew that Williams was religious, he should have known - and in 
fact did know - that the speech's initial reference to Williams as 
"Reverend" as well as its emphasis upon the need for a Christian 
burial were likely to play upon Williams's religious conscience. 124 
Moreover, in contrast to Innis, the police were aware that the suspect 
was "unusually disoriented or upset," at least in the sense that he 
was mentally ill and that he might be one who would shrink "from 
the prospect of flustering, displeasing, or irritating his captor."125 
When one further considers the sophistication and effectiveness of 
the Williams appeal, 126 a firm basis emerges for concluding that, 
I 19. See text at note 24 supra. 
120. Thus, in the second variation, Captain Learning's testimony that Williams expressed 
fear that "Leaming . • . 'wanted to kill him,' " and "that the state officers following them in 
another car might want to kill him,'' KAMISAR EssAYS at 120 n.10, would be eliminated. 
121. Williams held only that the defendant's sixth amendment right attaches "at least •.. 
at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 430 U.S. at 398. 
However, Innis appears to confirm Professor Kamisar's conclusion that the sixth amendment 
right will not come into effect until after formal judicial procedures have commenced or the 
defendant is represented by an attorney. See KAMISAR EssAYS at 216-18. 
122. Another possible issue would be whether Williams's statement to Captain Leaming 
was ''voluntary." 
123. See KAMISAR EsSAYS at 140-60. 
124. As Professor Kamisar notes, the Iowa Attorney General stated in his brief that Cap• 
tain Leaming admitted he was "playing upon Williams's religious conscience" when he made 
the "Christian burial speech." See KAMISAR EsSAYS at 122. 
125. KAMISAR EsSAYS at 120 (footnote omitted). 
126. See text at notes 128-31 infra. 
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from the police perspective, the appeal contained in the "Christian 
burial speech" was "reasonably likely" to be successful.127 
The second variation is more problematic. Since the defendant 
has no known susceptibilities, the effect of the "Christian burial 
speech" on an average suspect must be evaluated. The speech would 
undoubtedly present a powerful appeal to anyone's emotions. The 
highly dramatic picture painted with the aid of such emotive terms 
as "little girl's body," "Christian burial," and "Christmas· [E]ve," 
culminates with the detective's direct statement of the course of con-
duct that he believes appropriate: 
And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than wait-
ing until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and 
possibly not being able to find it at all. 128 
Even to a non-religious suspect, the likely message conveyed by 
these words is that "[t]he only decent and honorable thing for you to 
do is to show us where that body is on the way back to Des 
Moines." 129 Moreover, the force of this appeal to honor is likely to 
be enhanced not only by the confines in which it is delivered, 130 but 
also by the tendency for the pressure on the suspect produced by the 
appeal to build during the substantial period of time between the 
conclusion of the speech and the approach to the Mitchellville exit 
where the body was located.131 
Nevertheless, if the suspect in Williams were not religious, the 
force of the "challenge to his honor" would be considerably dissi-
pated because the appeal would not specifically relate to a matter of 
special importance to him. 132 If the suspect did not care about reli-
gion, he might be relatively unimpressed by an assertion that the 
child deserved a "Christian burial." Moreover, it is not clear that 
even a strong appeal to honor is "reasonably likely" to produce an 
127. However, a court could conceivably reach the opposite result. By emphasizing that 
"[o)n several occasions during the trip, [defendant) told the officers that he would tell them the 
whole story when he got to Des Moines and saw Mr. McKnight," Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 
387,432 (1977) (White, J., dissenting}, a court could conclude that, from the police perspective, 
the "Christian burial speech" was an effort to obtain evidence that appeared unlikely to suc-
ceed, because of the defendant's manifest resistance. 
128. 430 U.S. at 393. 
129. KAMISAR EssAYS at 125. 
130. The defendant was seated next to Captain Leaming in the back seat of a police car, a 
position which he would occupy for the next several hours. Brief for Petitioner at 55, 71, 77, 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)': 
131. See KAMISAR EssAYS at 123. 
132. The leading manual on police interrogation asserts that a "challenge to [the suspect's] 
Honor" will be most effective when the challenge relates to something to which the suspect has 
some special relationship or interest. KAMISAR EssAYS at 122, quoting F. INBAU & J. REID, 
supra note 2, at 76. 
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incriminating response from suspects in all situations. If the suspect 
in Williams had no special mental problems or anxieties, he would 
almost certainly realize the importance of not revealing that he knew 
the location of the child's body. That the police had informed him 
many times that "anything he said could be used against him" could 
be taken as evidence that, when the suspect later listened to Detec-
tive Learning's speech, he had a reasonable understanding of the 
stakes involved. And the suspect's assertion of his right to an attor-
ney on more than one occasion might also suggest that he had no 
intention of revealing information to the police unless counsel was 
present. Weighing these factors, a court could very plausibly find 
that the apparent probability of an incriminating response to the 
"Christian burial speech" would not meet the "reasonably likely" 
standard articulated in Innis. 133 
These illustrations demonstrate the dangers of interpreting the 
Innis test as turning upon apparent probability that an incriminating 
response will in fact be "elicited." Obviously, all of the subjectivity 
and uncertainty generated by the traditional voluntariness test would 
reappear. 134 In the hands of lower courts unsympathetic to defend-
ants' rights, Justice Stevens's prediction that the "new definition will 
almost certainly exclude every statement that is not punctuated with 
a question mark from the concept of 'interrogation' " 135 could prove 
to be very nearly accurate. This would open a gaping hole in the 
fifth amendment protections afforded by Miranda. As interpreted by 
Justice Stevens, the Innis rule would contrast sharply with the 
Court's treatment of direct interrogation, where no inquiry is made 
into whether the police thought their questions likely to yield incrim-
inating responses. In effect, the police would be offered an opportu-
nity to avoid the strictures of Miranda by engaging in indirect 
practices. Such a result seems inconsistent with the majority's pro-
fessed aim of defining "interrogation" in a manner consistent with 
Miranda's underlying policy of prohibiting all speech or conduct 
133. On the other hand, such a finding might appear inconsistent with the substantial em• 
pirical evidence suggesting that, in a custodial setting, even normal suspects who are fully 
aware of their rights will feel very considerable pressure to respond to the police when the 
police indicate that they want or expect a response. See Driver, Coefessions and the Social 
Psychology ef Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968); Griffith & Ayres, A Postscript to the 
Miranda Project: Interrogation ef .Drqft Pro/es/ors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967); Project -lnlerro• 
gation in New Haven: The Impact ef Miranda, 16 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967). 
134. For cases applying the "voluntariness" test, see, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 
U.S. 568 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). For discussions of the ''voluntari-
ness" test which illustrate some of the problems generated by the standard, see KAMISAR Es· 
SAYS at 41-77; .Developments, supra note 1. 
135. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1695 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
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which is the "functional equivalent" of direct questioning. 136 Thus, 
to interpret the Innis test in this way would be inconsistent with the 
core of the majority's analysis. 137 
136. See text at note 59 supra. 
137. This interpretation also seems inconsistent with the way courts and commentators 
applied the "reasonably likely" standard before Innis. In none of the discussion of the "likely" 
or "reasonably likely" standard before Innis did anyone propose an interrogator's apparent 
probability of success as the determining factor for whether interrogation had taken place. 
Rather, the standard's purpose was to include within the definition of "interrogation" any 
police conduct which would have an obvious tendency to induce an incriminating response 
from the suspect. 
Variations of the "reasonably likely to elicit" test were articulated as early as July 23, 1966, 
at a conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan. It was stated at the conference that "any police 
conduct, verbal or otherwise calculated to, expected to, or likely to stimulate incriminating 
statements from one in custody would seem to fall within the term 'custodial interrogation,' " 
Rothblatt & Pitier, Police Interrogation: Warnings and Waivers - Where Do We Go From 
Here, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 486-87 n.42 (1967) (emphasis added). See also C. McCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE 330 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (defining interrogation to include "any police action 
that is either calculated or reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating testimonial response 
from the accused") (emphasis added); Kamisar, Custodial Interrogation, in INSTITUTE OF CON· 
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION - SOURCES AND 
COMMENTATORS 355-56 (1968) ("It is submitted that it is not simply custody plus 'question-
ing,' as such, which calls for the Miranda safeguards but custody plus police conduct calculated 
to, expected to, or likely to, evoke admissions"); Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and 
Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Maller?, 67 GEO. L.J. 1 (1978), reprinted in 
KAMISAR EsSAYS 139, 158-60 (providing various tests, based on the facts of different cases, for 
impermissible interrogation, including "obvious purpose and likely effect," "augments or in-
tensifies the tolerable level of stress,'' and "not volunteered"). 
These articulations of the likelihood test, however, should be considered only in the context 
in which they were presented. The commentators in each instance were criticizing narrow 
court definitions of interrogation, within the factual framework of a given case. Their defini-
tions of the appropriate test should be limited to the cases they discussed, rather than extended 
to delimit the outer boundaries of police interrogation. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that any police conduct "likely to or expected to 
elicit a confession" should be considered "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. See 
Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 214, 302 A.2d 337, 339 (1973); Commonwealth v. 
Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292,296, 285 A.2d 172, 175 (1971). In Hamilton, appellant was confronted 
with an alleged coconspirator who accused him of being the "trigger man" in the crime. In 
discussing confrontation as a form of interrogation, the court noted that the coconspirator was 
"being used in an attempt to pry an incriminating statement from appellant" and that to per-
mit this technique "would be to place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise 
methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Mi-
randa . ... " 445 Pa. at 297, 285 A.2d at 175. Significantly, the Hamilton court's assertion of 
the need to "implement the plain mandate of Mirandd' was cited with explicit approval in 
Innis, thus indicating both the Court's awareness of the Pennsylvania variation of the "reason-
ably likely" test and its apparent approval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's underlying 
rationale. 
Taken together, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's application of the likelihood test, and 
the context in which the prior variations of the test were articulated, indicate that courts and 
commentators did not intend that the "likely" or "reasonably likely" standard refer to an inter-
rogator's apparent probability of success to determine whether interrogation had taken place. 
See Commonwealth v. Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973), (reading statement of third 
party implicating defendant held interrogation); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 285 
A.2d 172 (1971) (confronting suspect with accomplice who accused him of being the trigger 
man held interrogation). See also Rothblatt & Pitier, supra, at 487 n.42 ( examples of interro-
gation include "showing the murder weapon, placing evidence of the crime in front of the 
suspect, or playing a tape of an accomplice implicating the suspect"). 
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At the opposite extreme, the Innis majority's test could be inter-
preted as essentially similar to a different test articulated by Justice 
Stevens in his dissent. Justice Stevens suggested that interrogation in 
this context should be defined to include speech or conduct which 
would "appear to call for a[n] [incriminating] response." Yet, as ap-
plied by Justice Marshall in his Innis dissent, there is little or no 
difference between the Innis majority's test and the Stevens alterna-
tive. Justice Marshall found that because Officer Gleckman's re-
marks would carry a strong appeal to "any suspect's" conscience, the 
majority's test would always be met; 138 that is, the officer's remarks 
would always be "reasonably likely" to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse. But this analysis is correct only if the conversation's effect 
on the suspect is evaluated without regard to any countervailing con-
siderations which might make him hesitant to respond. Thus, in ap-
plying the majority's test, Justice Marshall appears to view the 
suspect as an average person, without considering any special cir-
cumstances which might make the suspect less likely to respond. If 
this is the proper focus of the inquiry, there is no apparent difference 
between the majority and the Stevens tests. Obviously, if an officer's 
statement or conduct would "appear to call for a response," an aver-
age suspect would be "reasonably likely" to respond in the absence 
of special considerations directing him to the contrary. 
However, while Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Innis test 
is not necessarily inconsistent with the majority's analysis, 139 it is cer-
tainly inconsistent with the majority's result. As both dissents indi-
cate, Officer Gleckman's words effectively convey the message that 
the police very much want to know the location of the shotgun. 140 
Accordingly, any person with knowledge of the shotgun's location 
would be likely to believe that the police wanted him to disclose its 
location. In the absence of circumstances directing him to the con-
trary, a person would be likely to give the desired response. Indeed, 
if the "reasonably likely" test is meant to be applied as Justice Mar-
shall interpreted it, then, as he states, 141 the majority's result "verges 
on the ludicrous." Accordingly, the result in Innis indicates that Jus-
138. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1692 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
139. In applying its test, the majority mentioned certain relevant factors, such as the fact 
that the suspect was not unusually disoriented or upset and that the officers' comments were 
short and not particularly evocative, 100 S. Ct. at 1691. However, the majority did not make 
clear to what extent, if any, factors relating to the suspect's likelihood of resistance should be 
taken into account. 
140. See 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 100 S. Ct. at 1697 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). 
141. 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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tice Marshall's interpretation of the Innis test cannot be accepted as 
defihitive. Thus, neither Justice Stevens's nor Justice Marshall's 
reading of the majority's test appears correct. 
There is an alternative interpretation of Innis which more closely 
fits both the majority's result and its analysis. Although the majority 
indicated that its inquiry is not directed toward determining whether 
the police actually intended to elicit an incriminating response, it 
dropped a footnote that stated that when "a police practice is 
designed to elicit an incriminating response," it is ''unlikely" that the 
"reasonably likely" test will not be met. 142 If the majority were deal-
ing strictly with probabilities, then, as Justice Stevens pointed out, 143 
this observation is patently incorrect because there are undoubtedly 
many cases in which police do attempt to elicit incriminating disclo-
sures from suspects even though they know that a particular attempt 
will have only a small probability of success.144 A better reading of 
this footnote is that it represents an effort to add some substantive 
content to the Innis test by establishing a close correlation between 
an officer's purpose to elicit an incriminating response and the "rea-
sonably likely" standard. However, since the majority specifically 
eschewed the approach of ferreting out the officer's actual pur-
pose, 145 this correlation cannot be exact.146 
In order to preserve both the majority's objective approach and a 
close correlation between the officer's purpose and the "reasonably 
likely" standard, the best reading of the Innis test is that it turns 
upon the objective purpose man!fested by the police. Thus, an officer 
"should know" that his speech or conduct will be "reasonably likely 
142. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7. To underline the significance of this aspect of its analysis, the 
Court added another footnote which, in partially justifying the result reached in Innis, empha-
sized that "[t]he record in no way suggests that the officer's remarks were designed to elicit a 
response." 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9. 
143. 100 S. Ct. at 1695 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
144. As the leading manual suggests, a successful "interrogation" will generally require 
considerable time. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at 13-23. Therefore, many attempts 
to elicit incriminating information may be perceived as unlikely to be successful. Such at-
tempts may be made not only because of the slim chance that they may strike paydirt, but also 
because of the cumulative effect they may have in wearing down the suspect's resistance. See, 
e.g., Id. at 62-64 (describing one version of the "Mutt and Jeff" routine). 
145. See 100 S. Ct. at 1690. 
146. As an example of police conduct that would not constitute "interrogation," the Court 
noted a hypothetical variation of Innis where the police did "no more than ... drive past the 
site of the concealed weapon while taking the most direct route to the police station." 100 S. 
Ct. at 1691 n.10. This hypothetical demonstrates the validity of the Court's refusal to focus 
upon the actual "design" of the police. No one could argue that the result in this hypothetical 
should be different even if the police admitted that their ''purpose" in driving by this site was 
to "elicit an incriminating response." For further discussion of cases similar to this hypotheti-
cal, see KAMISAR EsSAYS at 144 & 144 n.10. 
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to elicit an incriminating response" when he should realize that the 
speech or conduct will probably be viewed by the suspect as 
designed to achieve this purpose. To ensure that the inquiry is en-
tirely objective, the proposed test could be framed as follows: if an 
objective observer (with the same. knowledge of the suspect as the 
police officer) would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's re-
marks, infer that the remarks were designed to elicit an incriminat-
ing response, then the remarks should constitute "interrogation." 
Other parts of the Court's opinion also support this reading of the 
majority's test. Drawing from the language of a Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court case, the Court stated in a footnote that "[to] limit 
the ambit of Miranda to express questioning would 'place a premium 
on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interro-
gation, rather than implement the plain mandate of Miranda.' " 147 
By suggesting that Miranda's prohibition against "interrogation" 
must not be thwarted by the "ingenuity of the police," the Court 
implies that "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda should 
be defined to include, at the least, all situations where the police are 
plainly seeking to elicit incriminating evidence. 148 Moreover, imme-
diately after stating its test, the Court emphasized that the focus of 
the latter part of its definition is "primarily upon the perceptions of 
the suspect." 149 While this statement is in itself ambiguous, 150 when 
considered in conjunction with the Court's basic premise - that "in-
terrogation" should be defined to include speech or conduct which is 
the "functional equivalent" of a direct questioning151 - it suggests 
147. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.3, quoting Co=onwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 297, 285 
A.2d 172, 175 (1971). 
148. This interpretation of the Innis test would complement the approach developed by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As previously noted, that court has held that any police conduct 
"likely to or expected to elicit" an incriminating statement should be considered interrogation 
within the meaning of Miranda. See note 137 supra. In order to make the "reasonably likely" 
standard fulfill substantially the same function as the "likely to or expected to" standard, it is 
appropriate to interpret the test to include at least all situations in which a police "design" to 
elicit plainly appears. Moreover, as Justice Stevens's dissent points out, any other interpreta-
tion of Innis appears inconsistent with the rule developed by the Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96 (1975). 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The rule articulated in Mosley 
was that any statement elicited after the suspect has elected to remain silent must be excluded 
unless the suspect's assertion of his right was "scrupulously honored." 423 U.S. at 103, 104. 
When the police engage in conduct plainly designed to elicit an incriminating response, it 
should be apparent that they are not "scrupulously honoring" the suspect's assertion of his 
right. 
149. 100 S. Ct. at 1690. 
150. The focus upon the "perception of the suspect" could simply mean that the "percep-
tion" must be evaluated to determine whether, from the police perspective, the officer's speech 
or conduct will have a significant probability of inducing an incriminating response. This 
would fit with the "apparent probability'' reading of the test discussed above. See text at notes 
112-33 supra. 
151. 100 S. Ct. at 1689. 
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that the test is directed toward ascertaining whether the officer's 
speech or conduct "could reasonably have had the force of a ques-
tion on the accused," 152 an end best achieved by the proposed inter-
pretation. When an objective observer would infer that the officer's 
speech or conduct was "designed to elicit a response," he will per-
ceive it as at least an implicit demand for information. If, as will 
generally be the case, 153 the suspect shares this view of the police 
activity, he will experience the "functional equivalent" of direct 
questioning. 
Viewed in this light, the "reasonably likely to elicit" test gains a 
substantial measure of clarity. The test will be met- and the fruits 
of the police conduct excluded from evidence - at least in situations 
where an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect 
as the police officer) would infer that the officer's speech or conduct 
was designed to elicit an incriminating response. In other situations 
- that is, in situations where the objective observer would not infer 
the requisite purpose - application of the test would be more diffi-
cult; but presumably, in the absence of unusual circumstances,154 the 
152. Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980). 
153. As long as the police knowledge of the suspect is accurate, the suspect will view the 
police activity in the same way as the objective observer because the observer must take into 
account any special characteristics of the suspect known to the police. But see note 162 infra. 
154. Of course, the touchstone in applying the test should be an inquiry into whether the 
policeman's speech or conduct "could reasonably have had the force of a question on the 
accused." One type of case which might fall within this category is when the police should 
know that the suspect is so disturbed or sensitive that he is !!!cely to divulge incriminating 
information at the slightest provocation. In such a case the police should be held to know that 
even conduct not intended to elicit a response would be "reasonably likely" to have that effect 
because of the suspect's special susceptibility. 
Another type of situation in which police speech or conduct should be held to meet the 
"reasonably likely to elicit" test despite the absence of a finding of an objective "purpose to 
elicit" is exemplified by United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 (?th Cir. 1977). In that case, 
the defendant, who was suspected of drug smuggling, was detained in an airport and held for 
several minutes in a supervisor's office while a customs inspector talked to her. The trial court 
found that the inspector talked to the suspect as a "father might talk to a daughter," telling her 
that she could seriously harm or kill herself by carrying narcotics in her body. 556 F.2d at 256. 
While the Fifth Circuit found that the inspector's ''whole purpose . . . was to persuade the 
defendant to confess" (and thus found it to be "interrogation" on that basis), 556 F.2d at 255, a 
trial or appellate court could conceivably find that the purpose of the inspector's talk was 
solely to warn the suspect "of the risk she was running by carrying drugs internally." 556 F.2d 
at 256 (Gee, J., dissenting) and therefore that an objective observer would not perceive the talk 
as "designed to elicit an incriminating response." Even if this finding were made, the "talk" 
should still constitute "interrogation" under the Innis test. The difference between McCain 
and Innis is that unlike the Innis "remarks," the McCain "talk" has the effect of directly com-
municating to the suspect the message that disclosure of evidence (which is in fact incriminat-
ing) is necessary to avert the possibility of serious harm to herself. 
Where an objective observer would perceive that the officer's conduct has the effect of 
communicating to the defendant that a response (which is in fact incriminating) is highly im-
portant to the defendant, the "reasonably likely to elicit" test should be met because the "tug" 
on the suspect to disclose incriminating evidence will be likely to be at least equivalent to that 
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"reasonably likely to elicit" test would not be met. 155 
This reading of the Innis test explains the Innis result if one ac-
cepts the majority's conclusion that "[t]he record in no way suggests 
that the officers' remarks were designed to elicit a response." 156 At 
the same time, such a reading would be true to the spirit of Miranda 
in that police tactics such as reading a ballistics report to the sus-
pect, 157 showing him incriminating evidence, 158 and stating in his 
presence that another individual accused him of the crime159 would 
almost inevitably be characterized as "interrogation."160 The critical 
difference between these cases and Innis is that in Innis there is a 
produced when an objective observer would view the officer's conduct as designed to elicit an 
incriminating response. 
155. In determining whether the objective observer would infer the requisite prohibited 
purpose, the officer's motive for obtaining the incriminating response should not ordinarily be 
at issue. Thus, if it appears that the officer is seeking an incriminating response, the fact that 
his motive is to effect the "rescue" of a victim, see, e.g., People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 
P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1965); People v. Dean, 39 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 55S 
(1974), rather than to obtain evidence to be used against the suspect at trial, should be irrele-
vant. In either case, the "tug" on the suspect to produce incriminating evidence is identical, 
and the Innis test is formulated to focus on the degree of "tug" exerted on the suspect, not to 
require an inquiry into the police motives. See note 74 supra. 
However, one caveat must be added. In formulating its rule, the Court in Innis expressly 
excepted "words or action on the part of the police" that are "normally attendant to arrest and 
custody." Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980). Presumably, this exception 
means that, when the police are arresting a suspect or otherwise taking him into custody, their 
speech or conduct which is appropriate to this end will not constitute "interrogation" even 
though it may clearly appear designed to elicit an incriminating response. Cf. State v. Lane, 77 
Wash. 2d 860, 862, 467 P.2d 304, 306 (1970) (excepting from the definition of "interrogation" 
police questions which are "strictly limited to protecting the[ir] immediate physical safety"), 
156. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9 (emphasis in original). But the majority's conclusion may be 
difficult to accept. As Justice Stevens's dissent points out, 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) there is certainly "evidence in the record to support the view that Officer Gleckman's 
statement was intended to elicit a response from Innis." The assignment of Officer Gleckman 
to ride with Innis to the police station was itself unusual because Gleckman was not ordinarily 
assigned to the caged wagon. Moreover, the emotionally charged words spoken by Gleckman 
("God forbid" that a "little girl" should find the gun and "hurt herself') appear expressly 
designed to appeal to the conscience of a suspect. Since the officers were probably aware that 
the chance of a handicapped child hurting herself with the gun was in fact relatively slim, it 
seems unlikely that the true purpose of the conversation was to voice a genuine concern about 
the children's welfare. As Justice Stevens stated, at the least, the Rhode Island courts should 
have been "given an opportunity to apply the new standard to the facts of this case." 100 S. 
Ct. at 1698 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151. See Combs v. Wingo, 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972); KAMISAR EsSAYS at 156 n.21. 
158. See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 
(1977) (showing to defendant identification of his fingerprint on one of the ransom notes sent 
in kidnapping case). 
159. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964) (telling "defendant that (an-
other individual] had named him as the one who shot [the victim]"); Commonwealth v. 
Mercier, 451 Pa. 211, 302 A.2d 337 (1973) (reading to defendant the statement of another 
implicating him). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 44S Pa. 292, 28S A.2d 172 (1971) (con-
fronting defendant with confessed accomplices who identified him as the triggerman). 
160. Similarly, the "Christian burial speech" in Williams would ineluctably be character• 
ized as "interrogation." By its own terms, the speech makes it clear that a disclosure of incrim-
inating evidence is desired. See text at note 28 supra. Thus, an objective observer, whether or 
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basis for concluding that the officer's remarks were made for some 
purpose other. than that of obtaining evidence from the suspect. An 
objective listener could plausibly conclude that the policemen's re-
marks in Innis were made solely to express their genuine concern 
about the danger posed by the hidden shotgun. 161 This distinction is 
legally significant because when an impartial observer perceives the 
officer's purpose to be something other than eliciting information 
from the suspect, the suspect is likely to view the officer's purpose in 
the same way. 162 If the suspect takes such a view, he would differen-
tiate the speech or conduct from a "direct question" because he 
would not see it as a demand for information. Accordingly, the of-
not he was informed of the suspect's special characteristics, would view the policeman's speech 
as "designed to elicit an incriminating response." 
161. The trial court's apparent finding to this effect, see Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 
1682, 1690 n.9 (1980) (noting that the "trial judge ... concluded that it was 'entirely under-
standable that [the officers] would voice their concern [for the safety of the handicapped chil-
dren] to each other' "), gains some support from the unusual facts presented in Innis. Unlike 
most confession cases considered by the Court, Innis involved a situation in which the police 
officers were ordinary patrolmen, not detectives specifically trained in the art of interrogation. 
See text at note 50 supra. In addition, the patrolmen's only assignment was to transport the 
suspect. Indeed, they had specific instructions not to question the suspect during the trip to 
headquarters. See text at note 50 supra. Based on these factors, the case could certainly be 
differentiated from one in which the same comments were made under circumstances in which 
the probability of interrogation tactics being used would seem more apparent. If, for example, 
the remarks were made by homicide detectives at police headquarters, there would be a sub-
stantial basis for concluding that the police wanted to discover the location of the weapon 
through a tactic now recognized as standard by at least one leading police manual. See A. 
AUBREY & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 289 (3d ed. 1980). 
162. However, two caveats should be added. In exceptional cases like Innis, the extent to 
which the objective observer will perceive the police conduct as designed to elicit an incrimi-
nating response may depend upon the extent of his knowledge of police interrogation tactics. 
For example, if Officer Gleckman were a detective (a skilled and experienced interrogator 
assigned to investigate the Innis case) a knowledgeable objective observer (especially one who 
had read A. AUBREY & R. CAPUTO, supra note 161) would be likely to perceive the detective's 
remarks as designed to elicit an incriminating response even though a less knowledgeable per-
son (and presumably the suspect) would not necessarily view them in the same way. Thus, in 
applying the proposed test, the question arises whether the objective observer should be in-
vested with merely normal acuity or with a special knowledge of the art of police interrogation. 
If the goal is simply to protect the suspect from tactics which have the "force of a question," 
there is no reason to invest the observer with faculties not likely to be shared by the suspect. 
As long as the suspect does not view the police tactic as an implicit demand for incriminating 
information, there is no reason to characterize the tactic as "interrogation." On the other 
hand, if the court means to adhere to the Mosley rule requiring that the police "scrupulously 
honor'' a defendant's assertion of his Miranda rights, the police should then be prohibited 
from any conduct, whether the conduct has the "force of a question" or not, which appears 
designed to cause a relinquishment of those rights. If this view is adopted, then the impartial 
observer should be vested with a complete knowledge of interrogation practices. As a result, in 
exceptional cases like Innis where the purpose of the police conduct in question is not immedi-
ately apparent, familiarity with the contents of police manuals may be indispensable to effec-
tive advocacy on behalf of the defendant. 
A second caveat is that when the suspect has peculiar characteristics that the police appar-
ently do not know about, the suspect may view the police speech or conduct differently than 
the hypothetical objective observer would. However, because the test is an objective one, the 
suspect's differing view would have to be considered irrelevant. 
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ficer's speech or conduct would not be the "functional equivalent" of 
"direct questioning" because the "measure of compulsion above and 
beyond that inherent in custody itself' 163 would be lacking.164 
If this reading of Innis is correct, 165 then, despite its holding, In-
nis reinvigorates Miranda because it provides a test which is fully 
responsive to the concerns of the Miranda decision. Moreover, in 
most situations the test will not be difficult to apply. "Interrogation" 
will be defined to include, in addition to direct questioning, at least 
any police speech or conduct which an objective observer would per-
ceive as "designed" to elicit an incriminating response. This test will 
be difficult to apply only in the exceptional situation where the po-
lice have elicited an incriminating response by engaging in activity 
for some purpose other than eliciting a response. Thus, if properly 
applied, the Innis test will afford suspects the type of protection from 
police tactics that was contemplated by Miranda. 
B. Henry's Test 
The test applied by the Court in Henry is neither as far-reaching 
nor as definitive as the Innis test. Whereas the Innis test defined 
"interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda, Henry did not pur-
port to define "deliberate elicitation" within the meaning of Mas-
siah. The Court merely held that "deliberate elicitation" within the 
163. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 (1980). 
164. In that situation the police activity should not be deemed "interrogation" unless the 
"tug" on the suspect to disclose incriminating evidence would appear to be at least as strong as 
that produced by activity which would appear to be "designed to elicit an incriminating re• 
sponse." See note 154 supra. 
165. The first lower courts to apply the Innis test employed approaches that are apparently 
consistent with the one advocated in this Article. In State v. Durand, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 
2327 (1980) (Neb. Sup. Ct., June IO, 1980), the Nebraska Supreme Court held that showing the 
defendant police reports of other crimes was "interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. 
In appying Inni.is "reasonably likely to elicit" test, the court found that the police conduct was 
the "functional equivalent of questioning" because it implied "the threat of other prosecutions 
for other crimes." Thus, the court did not focus upon the apparent probability of the tactic's 
success, but rather appeared concerned with the apparent police purpose in utilizing it. In 
State v. Jones, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2342 (La. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1980), the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that stating to a defendant accused of murdering his small son that "God 
takes care of little babies" and that "the baby was already in heaven" was not "interrogation" 
because "the statement was more in the nature of consolation." As in Innis, the statement is 
apparently condoned because there is a plausible basis for concluding that it was made for a 
purpose other than that of eliciting an incriminating response. 
In a third recent case, a New York appellate court also interpreted interrogation in a man• 
ner consistent with the Court's holding in Innis. In People v. Bodner, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 
2414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div., 4th Dept., July 10, 1980), the court held that a police detec• 
tive's pre-Miranda warning statement to a prime suspect in an arson case that an alternate 
suspect's alibi indicated that the prime suspect was lying constituted interrogation within the 
meaning of Miranda. The court held that the policeman's sudden confrontation of the suspect 
was unquestionably conduct "reasonably likely to elici~ an incriminating response." 
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meaning of Massiah will be present when the police "intentionally 
create a situation [that is] likely to induce ... incriminating state-
ments."166 Further, the Court structured its analysis so as to limit 
the ramifications of this test. By emphasizing the significance of the 
government's deception and the defendant's confinement in custody, 
the Court indicated that the analysis applied in Henry could well be 
limited to the post-arraignment167 'Jail-plant" situation - that is, to 
situations in which suspects, after being arraigned and confined in 
custody, make incriminating statements to agents or informants who 
fail to disclose their true identity. 
However, in addressing this area oflaw, the Court's analysis con-
stituted a significant refinement of Massiah. In Massiah the Court 
encountered a situation where the government's objective was to ob-
tain incriminating statements from the suspect. The government 
pursued that objective by executing a scheme calculated to elicit in-
criminating statements at a specific point in time. Thus, after Mas-
siah and his confederate Colson were indicted and released on bail, 
Colson, who without Massiah's knowledge had agreed to cooperate 
with the government, 168 invited Massiah to discuss their case in Col-
son's car while it was parked on a city street. A radio transmitter 
was installed in the car to enable a nearby federal agent, equipped 
with a receiving device, to overhear the conversation. As expected, 
Massiah made several incriminating statements.169 The Court held 
that use of these statements against Massiah at his trial violated his 
sixth amendment rights because the statements were "deliberately 
elicited" in the absence of counsel. 170 
Professor Kamisar's analysis of Massiah demonstrates that its re-
sult should not tum upon whether Colson asked Massiah any ques-
tions171 or even upon whether the two engaged in any conversation 
at all. 172 Moreover, the Supreme Court's 1967 per curiam decision 
in Beatty v. United States113 indicates that Massiah's result would 
not be altered even if Massiah had initially requested the meeting 
166. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (1980). 
167. In Henry, the Court specified that it was dealing with a ''post-indictment" confronta-
tion "between government agents and the accused." 100 S. Ct. at 2186. However, in view of 
Wi/liams's holding that the sixth amendment right comes into effect when the defendant is 
arraigned, see text at note 37 supra, the decision in Henry cannot tum on the fact that the 
defendant had been indicted rather than arraigned. 
168. 377 U.S. 201, 202 (1964). 
169. 377 U.S. at 202-03. 
170. 377 U.S. at 206. 
171. KAMISAR EsSAYS at 175. 
172. Id. at 42-43. 
173. 389 U.S. 45 (1967). 
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with Colson, as long as the government played some part in setting 
the meeting up. 174 Nevertheless, based on the holding and analysis 
of Massiah, the "deliberate elicitation" test could have been limited 
to apply only to situations in which the government executed a 
scheme expressly designed to elicit incriminating statements · from 
the defendant175 at a particular moment in time. 176 Accordingly, a 
case like Henry could have been distinguished because there was no 
showing that the government at any time developed or executed any 
specific plan designed to elicit incriminating statements from the de-
fendant. At most, the government in Henry created a situation in 
which it hoped to obtain incriminating statements at some point. 
Thus, the Court's decision in Henry extends Massiah by holding 
that, at least in the ''jail-plant" context, the government may violate 
the sixth amendment even though it lacked a specific purpose to 
elicit incriminating statements at the time they were elicited. 
This is not to say that the Court's approach in Henry is entirely 
"objective."177 In Henry the government did intend to elicit incrimi-
174. In Beatty, an undercover government agent named Sirles purchased a machine gun 
from the defendant. After the defendant's indictment, he contacted Sirles, requested a meet-
ing, and proposed the time and place of the meeting. Sirles agreed to attend the meeting after 
another government agent, McGinnis, instructed him to do so. The meeting was held in 
Sirles's automobile, with McGinnis hidden in the trunk. As expected, the defendant made 
incriminating statements. The Fifth Circuit held the statements admissible, distinguishing 
Massiah on the ground that the meeting in Massiah was "government sponsored" while the 
one in Beatty was initiated by the defendant. Beatty v. United States, 377 F.2d 181, 190 (5th 
Cir. 1967). However, the Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam decision. 389 U.S. 45 
(1967). For further discussion of Beatty, see KAMISAR EssAYS at 178-79 n.42; Dix, Undercover 
Investigations and Police Ru!emaking, S3 TEXAS L. REV. 203, 232-34 (197S). 
175. This "government sponsored" test is clearly met in Beatty as well as Massiah. Even 
though the meeting in Beatty was not initiated by the government, the government used the 
available circumstances to execute a plan for eliciting incriminating statements. This conclu-
sion is supported by the fact that, at the time of the meeting between the defendant and Sirles, 
agent McGinnis was hidden in the trunk of Sirles's auto, equipped with a tape-recording de-
vice. See 377 F.2d at 184. 
176. Accord, Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 94S 
(1979). In Wilson, the defendant's cell-mate, Benny Lee, had previously agreed to act as an 
undercover informant. Government agents "instructed [Lee] not to inquire or question, but to 
keep his ears open for information which could lead to the apprehension of [Wilson's] accom-
plices." Wilson and Lee engaged in a number of conversations. At first, Wilson merely stated 
that he had witnessed the crime but was not personally involved. Lee's only response was that 
"the story did not sound too good." By the end of the third day in the cell with Lee, Wilson 
admitted to Lee his complicity in the crimes charged against him. S84 F.2d at I 187. The 
Fourth Circuit held that Wilson's admissions were not "deliberately elicited" within the mean-
ing of Massiah, 584 F.2d at 1191. Professor Kamisar argues that the Wilson case is indistin-
guishable from Massiah because in Massiah there was no "indication that Colson 
'interrogated' Massiah or asked him a single question." KAMISAR EssAYS at 176 n.39. How-
ever, at least prior to Henry, Massiah could be distinguished because in Wilson it was not clear 
that Lee ever "attempt[ed] to ... elicit incriminating remarks,'' 584 F.2d at I 191, while in 
Massiah the government executed a scheme clearly designed to have this effect. 
177. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. at 2183, 2191 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court's "new objective approach"). 
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nating statements in the sense that its underlying objective was to 
obtain them from the suspect. The Court's analysis emphasizes this 
factor178 but does not indicate whether its presence is indispensable 
to Henry's holding. Thus, the Court's statement of the basis for 
Henry's result is ambiguous. The Court states that a Massiah viola-
tion occurs when the government "intentionally creat[es] a situation 
likely to induce" the suspect to make incriminating statements.179 
However, it is not clear whether this test requires (1) that the govern-
ment know that incriminating statements are likely to be induced by 
the situation it created, 180 or (2) that the government should have 
known of this possibility,181 or (3) only that the government "inten-
tionally create a situation" which in fact is likely to induce incrimi-
nating statements. 1s2 
The "likely to induce" component of the Henry test is also some-
what ambiguous. As with the Innis likelihood test, one possible in-
terpretation of this aspect of Henry is that it focuses upon the 
apparent probability that the tactics of an undercover informant will 
elicit an incriminating response. Justice Blackmun adopted this view 
of the Henry test. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that the test was not met - and the incriminating evidence was 
admissible - because the lack of a prior relationship between Nich-
ols and Henry and the natural C!rrcumspection with which a prison 
178. See, e.g., 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.8 (noting that Nichols's instructions "singled out Henry 
as the inmate in whom the agent had a special interest" and directed Nichols to the desirability 
of obtaining incriminating information). 
179. 100 S. Ct. at 2189. 
180. The Court indicated that on the facts of Henry the government "must have known" of 
the possibility. 100 S. Ct. at 2187. 
181. Placing this gloss on the Henry test might appear consistent with the Court's formula-
tion of the Innis test. For an argument that the two tests need not be consistent in this respect, 
see text at notes 215-17 i'!fi-a. 
182. A further difficulty in applying any of these tests arises because in some situations it 
may be unclear to what extent conduct of the undercover informant will be attributed to the 
government .. The Court implied that even if Nichols's conduct in relation to Henry were ex-
actly the same, the result in Henry might have been different if Nichols had had different 
instructions from the FBI. Thus, the Court intimated that Nichols might be acting as a gov-
ernment agent for some purposes but not for others. The problem with this approach is that it 
could lead to attempts to circumvent Massiah through disingenuous word games. Cf. State v. 
Smith, 107 Ariz. 100, 102, 482 P.2d 863, 865 (1971) (when defendant's cell-mate asked what 
information police needed, the response was, "I can't tell you anything, what we need or what 
we are interested in getting as far as evidence on the man because ... ifwe told you 'we need 
this, go get it,' and you did ... you would be acting as an agent for us"). In any event, the 
approach appears misdirected. The correct approach, and one which apparently has been uti-
lized by the Court in the past, is to hold that once it is determined that an individual is in fact a 
government agent, his conduct should be attributed to the government regardless of whether it 
was expressly or implicitly authorized by his instructions. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293-(1966) (determining the validity of the government's conduct solely on the basis ofan 
examination of the undercover agent's conduct). 
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detainee would be likely to act indicated that "there was little reason 
to believe that even the most aggressive efforts by Nichols would 
lead to disclosures by Henry." 183 While Justice Blackmun's reading 
of the test is not necessarily inconsistent with the majority's analy-
sis, 184 it certainly is inappropriate in view of the underlying constitu-
tional interests at stake. If Justice Blackmun's approach were 
adopted, the government could narrow the scope of sixth amend-
ment protection by merely publicizing its intention to employ under-
cover agents in a wide variety of situations. 185 But as Chief Justice 
Burger stated in Henry, the Massiah rule is designed to prevent "im-
permissible interference with the right to the assistance of coun-
sel." 186 Certainly, the extent of governmental interference permitted 
should not be subject to manipulation by the government. There-
fore, Justice Blackmun's interpretation of the Henry "likely to in-
duce" test cannot be accepted. 
On the other hand, neither can we plug the reading of the Innis 
test proposed in this Article into the Henry "likely to induce" stan-
dard. The precise significance of Henry is that it extends Massiah by 
holding that sixth amendment violations may occur even when the 
government manifests no specific purpose to elicit incriminating 
statements at the time the statements are obtained. 187 Accordingly, it 
would be inappropriate to hold that the "likely to induce" test will 
generally be met only when an objective observer (with the govern-
ment's knowledge of the suspect) would conclude that the govern-
ment was engaging in conduct "designed to elicit an incriminating 
response." Clearly, a lesser standard is intended.188 
Perhaps the best reading of the "likely to induce" test is that, at 
least in the 'Jail-plant" context, the test will be met when the govern-
ment's deceptive conduct increases the defendant's predisposition to-
ward making an incriminating response. This approach is consistent 
183. 100 S. Ct. at 2195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
184. Beyond discussing the impact of custody on all suspects' powers of resistance, see l 00 
S. Ct. at 2188, the Court does not refer to any factors bearing on the powers of resistance of 
either Henry or suspects in general. 
185. q. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 
(1974) ("[a]n actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in ..• a theory 
of what the fourth amendment protects [because ifit did] .•• the government could diminish 
each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on televi-
sion • . . that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveil-
lance"). 
186. 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
181. See text following note 176 supra. 
188. A further indication that the Innis and Henry tests are not to be read in the same way 
appears when the Court in Innis emphasizes the differences between the fifth and sixth amend-
ment tests. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 n.4 (1980). 
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with the Court's result in Henry. While the Court stopped short of 
holding that all statements made to ''jail-plant" informants must be 
suppressed, 189 it indicated that the government engages in sufficient 
"affirmative conduct" to meet the test when the undercover agent 
does anything to "gain the confidence" of the defendant. 190 Thus, 
the only distinction between Henry and the "listening post" cases on 
which the Court reserved judgment is that in Henry the agent's con-
duct increased the likelihood that the defendant would make an in-
criminating disclosure. In other words, before arraignment a suspect 
like Innis is protected from the government's "tug"191 to respond 
only when that tug is the functional equivalent of a question. After 
arraignment, a defendant in the Henry ''jail-plant" context is pro-
tected from any "tug" which will have a tendency to elicit incrimi-
nating information.192 
Ill. BEYOND INNIS AND HENRr. THREE REMAINING ISSUES 
The analysis in Innis and Henry may be extrapolated so as to 
provide some further guidance, albeit speculative, in dealing with 
other aspects of indirect or surreptitious questioning. Without haz-
arding any firm predictions as to the decisions' eventual impact, this 
Article will conclude by briefly examining three issues that are 
closely related to those decided by the Court in Innis and Henry. 
These issues involve when to exclude (1) incriminating statements 
189. During the oral argument in Henry, Justice Stevens suggested the Court could solve 
the problem of drawing the line between an informer's "conversation" and "interrogation" by 
ruling that "all post-indictment statements made to informers will be suppressed." 26 CRIM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 4174 (1980). 
190. See text at note 86 supra. 
191. The concept of the Court's constitutional rules prohibiting a "tug" on the suspect to 
confess was first articulated by one of the Miranda dissents. See 384 U.S. at 512 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
192. As has been noted, see text at note 80 supra, the Henry Court reserves judgment on 
the case in which no "tug" is produced because the informer is a "passive" listener or one who 
"makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged." 100 S. Ct. at 2187 n.9. 
However, at least in the "jail-plant" context, any effort to make a practical distinction between 
the active informant (who produces a "tug") and the "passive" one (who merely hears incrimi-
nating statements) seems doomed to failure. First, since the informer and the defendant would 
probably be in prison together over a substantial period of time, it would be virtually impossi-
ble for either of them to re-create at trial the precise context in which the defendant's incrimi-
nating disclosure arose. Even with respect to a specific conversation, the defendant would be 
unlikely to recall whether the agent was a "passive" listener or one who stimulated conversa-
tion about the crime because, at the time of the conversation, the defendant would have no 
reason to know that the conversation might assume legal significance. On the other hand, the 
informer's obvious incentive to obtain legally admissible incriminating statements might lead 
him to distort details of the conversation to the advantage of the government. Second, even if 
a defendant makes incriminating statements during a conversation with an apparently "pas-
sive:• informant, he may be responding to "tugs" by the informant that occurred hours or days 
earlier. 
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made by a suspect to police officers in a post-arraignment context; 
(2) statements made to a 'jail-plant" informant in the pre-arraign-
ment context;193 and (3) statements made to an undercover agent by 
an indicted suspect who is free on bail.194 
A. Incriminating Post-Arraignment Statements to Police Officers 
In order to evaluate the sixth amendment protection afforded 
suspects after they have been arraigned, it is helpful to consider how 
a case like Innis would be decided if the suspect had been arraigned 
or indicted before he was placed in the police car. Since the suspect's 
sixth amendment right to counsel would then be applicable, 195 Jus-
tice Stewart's footnote in Innis at least raises the possibility of a dif-
ferent result. 196 Moreover, if this version of the Innis case is 
compared with the facts of Henry, the defendant has a strong argu-
ment that the "tug" on him to produce an incriminating statement is 
sufficient to invoke the sixth amendment protection. "Custody" is 
present in this case just as it was in Henry; and since Officer Gleck-
man's remarks appear to call for an incriminating response, 197 the 
pressure to respond appears to be at least as great as that produced 
by an undercover agent's act of gaining a suspect's confidence. 
Nevertheless, drawing from Chief Justice Burger's analysis in 
Henry, the government could present several arguments against af-
fording the sixth amendment right to counsel in this context. The 
weakest of these arguments is that the defendant's voluntary disclo-
sure that he would tell the police where the shotgun was located 198 
constituted a waiver of his sixth amendment rights. The possibility 
of waiver is suggested by Chief Justice Burger's statement that 
"waiver" could not apply in Henry because the suspect was "una-
ware" that he was dealing with "a government agent expressly com-
missioned to secure evidence."199 Citing this language, the 
government could argue that because the defendant knew that he 
was dealing with government agents and was aware of his constitu-
193. For a discussion of this issue, see KAMISAR EssAYS at 188-201. 
194. For discussions of this issue, see KAMISAR EssAYS at 175-79; Dix, supra note 174, at 
232-34. 
195. See text at note 167 supra. 
196. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4. 
197. See text at notes 138-41 supra. 
198. I here refer to Innis's statement ''that the officers should tum the car around so he 
could show them where the gun was located." Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1687 
(1980). In Innis, the Court did not decide whether Innis had waived his rights under Miranda 
before making this statement. 
199. 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
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tional rights, his decision to respond to Gleckman's remark with an 
obviously incriminating statement waived his sixth amendment 
rights. But while this concept of waiver has been endorsed by Justice 
White,200 the Court expressly rejected it in Williams, emphasizing 
that "waiver requires not merely comprehension but relinquish-
ment."201 Like the defendant in Williams, the defendant in this vari-
ation of Innis asserted his right to counsel and neither expressly nor 
implicitly indicated a willingness to forego that right.202 Accord-
ingly, the "relinquishment" necessary to a finding of waiver is not 
present in this case. 
Based on other language in Henry,203 the government could also 
argue that the sixth amendment protection afforded the defendant 
when he is dealing with " 'arms length' adversaries"204 need not be 
so great because of his increased powers of resistance. Thus, when a 
defendant knows he is dealing with government agents, a very slight 
"tug" on him to confess should not be sufficient to meet Henry's 
"likely to induce" test. Agreement with this position need not lead 
one to interpret the "likely to induce" test to require consideration of 
all factors bearing upon the suspect's powers of resistance.205 The 
point is merely that, while the government's deceit does not increase 
the pressure on a defendant to respond, it undoubtedly enhances the 
efficacy of certain tactics.206 Thus, a tactic employed without deceit 
may not be equated with one which is used against a suspect who is 
unaware that he is dealing with the government. For example,. while 
Henry holds that government deceit plus the gaining of the suspect's 
confidence while he is in custody violates his sixth amendment 
200. See note 101 supra. 
201. 430 U.S. at 404. Drawing upon principles expressed in Judge Friendly's dissent in 
United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971), the 
Second Circuit recently held that the standards applicable for an indicted defendant's waiver 
of his sixth amendment rights are higher than the requirements for a waiver of a suspect's 
Miranda rights. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980). While the Supreme 
Court has indicated that standards of ''waiver'' are variable, depending upon the nature of the 
constitutional issue at stake, see Schnecklothe v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-46 (1973), it 
has never intimated that it would accept the Second Circuit's position on this issue. 
202. Of course, after receiving additional warnings from Captain Leyden, Innis did indi-
cate that he was willing to forego his constitutional rights, see text at note 53 supra. However, 
Innis's first statement was clearly incriminating because it indicated his knowledge of the mur-
der weapon's location. If the first statement was improperly obtained, its close proximity in 
time to Innis's later disclosure of the shotgun's location would likely render the latter inadmis-
sible as well. See, e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954) ("subsequent confessions 
excluded because so closely related to coerced first confession that facts of one control charac-
ter of others"). 
203. See 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
204. 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
205. For a criticism of this approach, see text at notes 184-86 supra. 
206. See 100 S. Ct. at 2188. 
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rights, it does not follow that, in the absence of any deceit, a police 
officer's act of gaining a defendant's confidence would in itself be 
sufficient to vitiate a defendant's incriminating response. Turning 
back to the Williams case, if after Captain Leaming told Williams 
that he "had had religious training and background as a child, and 
that [he] would probably come more near praying for him than [he] 
would to abuse him or strike him,"207 Williams had immediately re-
sponded with an incriminating statement, nothing in Wilfiams,208 
Henry, or any other case suggests that the statement would be held 
inadmissible. 209 
Nevertheless, even granting that absence of governmental deceit 
affects the constitutionality of police conduct, remarks like those of 
Officer Gleckman in Innis should constitute a sufficient "tug" on the 
defendant to invoke the protection of the sixth amendment. The ra-
tionale that appears to underlie the Court's sixth amendment cases is 
that the defendant's right to counsel attaches when adversary pro-
ceedings commence because the "criminal investigation has en-
ded,"210 and, at least with respect to government elicitation of 
incriminating statements, the defendant is entitled to substantially 
the same type of protection as he would have at trial.211 Thus, while 
comparing the "tug" in Innis with the "tug" in Henry amounts to a 
weighing of imponderables, it should be sufficient that remarks like 
those of Officer Gleckman, that appear to be "calling for a re-
sponse,"212 produce a tangible "tug" on the defendant. Where the 
defendant is subjected to a "tug" of this magnitude, he is entitled to 
the protection of the sixth amendment to preserve the adversary bal-
ance between himself and the government. 
Finally, the government could argue that the defendant's sixth 
amendment right in this variation of Innis was not violated because 
207. Brief for Petitioner, Joint App. at 80, quoted in KAMISAR EssAYS at 119 n.6. 
208. In Williams the Court emphasized that some type of "interrogation" is necessary 
before a sixth amendment violation can be established. See text at note 38 supra. 
209. q., United States v. Gaynor, 472 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding unsolicited incrim-
inating statements made by defendant to postal inspector who had previously interrogated him 
not in violation of Massiah because no "interrogation" occurred at the time statement ob-
tained). 
210. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 493-94 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). In defining 
the point at which sixth amendment rights attach, the Court appears to have accepted the view 
expressed in Justice Stewart's Escobedo dissent. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 
(1972). See generally Grano, supra note 98, at 6-7. 
211. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 494 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (once 
"adversary proceedings have co=enced, • . . the constitutional guarantees attach which per-
tain to a criminal trial, ... "; included among these is "the guarantee of the assistance of 
counsel"). See generally Grano, supra note 98, at 20. 
212. Compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1694 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Officer Gleckman's remarks were not "designed to elicit an incrimi-
nating response."213 This argument raises the question whether any 
governmental purpose to "elicit" incriminating statements is prereq-
uisite to a Massiah violation. As previously noted,214 Henry is am-
biguous on this issue. The Henry test could imply that the 
government violates the sixth amendment whenever it "intention-
ally" engages in conduct "likely to induce" an incriminating re-
sponse, regardless of its underlying purpose in engaging in the 
conduct; or the test could be read to require that the government 
"intend" ( or be aware) that its conduct would be "likely to induce" 
an incriminating response before it can violate the sixth amendment. 
Finally, an intermediate position would require an objective inquiry 
into the government's purpose, with the test met if the inquiry 
reveals that the government should have known that its conduct 
would be "likely to induce" an incriminating response. 
Because the Court opted for an objective focus on the officer's 
knowledge in Innis,215 it is plausible to predict that it will employ the 
same approach to the Henry test. Nevertheless, there are sixth 
amendment grounds for eschewing any inquiry into governmental 
purpose. As has already been noted, 216 the policy underlying the de-
fendant's sixth amendment right is to maintain a proper adversary 
balance between the defendant and the government. Any govern-
mental action that improperly tilts the balance to the detriment of 
the defendant should be prohibited. Accordingly, once it is deter-
mined that governmental conduct produces a "tug" of sufficient 
magnitude to interfere with the defendant's right to counsel, it is ir-
relevant whether the government intended to produce this "tug" or 
even whether it should have foreseen the likelihood of its occurrence; 
so long as the "tug" is in fact produced, the effect on the defendant is 
the same: as a result of governmental action, he has been subjected 
to an impermissible degree of pressure to make incriminating state-
ments. 217 This analysis218 leads one to conclude that, in this hypo-
213. See 100 S. Ct. at 1690 n.9 (emphasis in original). 
214. See text at notes 177-82 supra. 
215. See 100 S. Ct. at 1687. 
216. See text at note 211 supra. 
217. As Professor Dix notes, cases dealing with "involuntary" confessions provide some 
additional support for this view. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963) (state-
ment that was result of "truth serum" qualities of a drug would be inadmissible as involuntary 
even if police officers were unaware of its truth-inducing qualities and administered it only to 
alleviate subject's withdrawal symptoms). See Dix, supra note 174, at 234 and n.75. 
218. The analysis runs counter to Inniss dicta stating that "the police surely cannot be 
held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions." 100 S. Ct. at 1687. 
However, this dicta occurs in a context where the Court is defining "interrogation" within the 
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thetical variation of Innis, the defendant's incriminating disclosures 
would have been obtained in violation of Massiah even if Officer 
Gleckman's purpose in making his remarks was solely to express his 
genuine concern about the safety of the children and even if the of-
ficer should not have foreseen that his remarks would be "likely to 
induce" an incriminating response.219 
B. Incriminating Pre-Arraignment Statements to 
"Jail-Plant" Informants 
In exploring this area, it is helpful to consider how a case like 
Henry would have been decided if the defendant had been placed in 
jail with an informant before being arraigned. Consider this case: 
After a defendant like Henry is arrested, an FBI agent gives him the 
warnings required by Miranda; and the defendant asserts his right to 
an attorney. The agent then tells the defendant that an attorney will 
be appointed after arraignment, and places him in a cell with an 
informer like Nichols. The informant has been told that he will be 
rewarded if he can elicit incriminating statements from the defend-
ant, but he has also been warned to refrain from questioning the 
defendant about the charges against him. The informant initiates a 
conversation with the defendant and proceeds to describe his own 
legal problems to the defendant. In response, the defendant makes 
damaging admissions. 
By its own terms, the Henry decision would not apply to this case 
because the hypothetical defendant has been neither indicted nor ar-
raigned. 220 Moreover, Innis makes clear that the sixth amendment 
right to an attorney does not attach merely because the police have 
arrested the defendant, informed him of his right to an attorney, or 
heard him assert that right.221 Accordingly, the hypothetical defend-
meaning of Miranda. Since the policies underlying Miranda and the defendant's sixth amend-
ment protection "are quite distinct," 1100 S. Ct. at 1687 n.4, it is not inconceivable that the 
police could be held accountable for "unforeseeable results" in the latter context. 
219. Inniss conclusion that Officer Gleckman should not have foreseen that his remarks 
were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" does not negate the possibility that 
the officer should have foreseen that the remarks were "likely to induce" an incriminating 
response within the meaning of Henry. The latter standard is clearly more stringent than the 
former. See text at note 196 supra. 
220. See text at note 167 supra. 
221. In Innis, all these events had taken place. Nevertheless, the Court unequivocally held 
that the case must be decided on the basis of Miranda rather than Massiah. See 100 S. Ct. at 
1687 n.4. Justice Stevens's dissent cogently argued that Innis's assertion of his right to counsel 
should invoke his sixth amendment rights under Massiah-Williams because, once the right was 
asserted, "the police had an unqualified obligation to refrain from trying to elicit a response 
from the suspect in the absence of his attorney." 100 S. Ct. at 1694 n.7. However, the majority 
never addressed this matter. 
The Stevens dissent also raises the related question of whether, under Miranda, a suspect 
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ant would be unable to invoke his rights under Massiah.222 
Although the Supreme Court has never clearly resolved the issue, 
it appears that the hypothetical defendant would also be unable to 
invoke Miranda. Professor Kamisar has persuasively demonstrated 
that "[i]t is the impact on the suspect's mind of the interplay between 
police interrogation and police custody - each condition reinforcing 
the pressures and anxieties produced by the other" which creates 
"custodial interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda.223 Since 
the hypothetical defendant is unaware that he is speaking to a gov-
ernment agent, the necessary "interplay" cannot be present. The 
Supreme Court apparently confirmed the validity of this analysis by 
implying that in a case like Henry, Miranda could not be applied 
because it is "limited to custodial police interrogation."224 
Thus, in this hypothetical, the defendant's only way to persuade 
a court to exclude the incriminating admissions to the informer 
would lie in an argument that his admissions were involuntary. By 
invoking the Court's decision in Spano v. New York,225 the defend-
ant could argue that, when he is in custody, the government's use of 
this type of deceit renders a resulting confession involuntary because 
it "unfairly impairs [the defendant's] capacity to make a rational 
choice."226 The essence of this argument is that custody in itself ere-
should be entitled to greater protection after he asserts his rights than before asserting them. 
As Justice Stevens indicates, the Court's decision in Mosley suggests a basis for distinguishing 
the two situations. See 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Before the suspect asserts 
his rights, the police are merely precluded from "interrogating" him; however, after he asserts 
his rights, they are required to "strictly honor" his assertion, a requirement which would ap-
pear to mandate more than simply a prohibition of "interrogation." See note 162 supra. 
222. Neither Henry nor Innis defines the precise point at which the suspect's right to an 
attorney will attach. Based on Williams, it appears that at least the "beginning" of the "crimi-
nal prosecution" activates the suspect's sixth amendment right. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 
U.S. 387, 398 (1977). For a discussion of the New York cases holding that the suspect's sixth 
amendment right will also be invoked as soon as he is represented by an attorney, see 
KAMISAR EsSAYS at 213-14. 
223. KAMISAR ESSAYS at 195. 
224. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
225. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the defendant adamantly resisted police efforts to 
obtain an incriminating statement until he was confronted by Bruno, a fledgling officer who 
was also the defendant's childhood friend, and who by telephone had persuaded Spano to 
surrender to the police. Under orders from his police superiors, Bruno falsely told the defend-
ant that his "telephone call had gotten him [Bruno] into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, 
and that the loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn 
child." 360 U.S. at 323. After Bruno repeated this story four times within an hour, the decep-
tion successfully elicited a confession. Although the Court held that the confession was invol-
untary based on the totality of the circumstances, the majority opinion's marked distaste for 
Bruno's conduct indicated that the use of such a strategem might in itself invalidate the result-
ing confession. 
226. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,507 n.4 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, .Detention, Interrogation and Rights lo Counsel· Basic Problems and 
Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 62, 73-74 (1966)). 
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ates considerable pressure on the suspect to incriminate himself227 
and that "the trickery of the jail-plant' ploy affords the suspect no 
opportunity to apply his powers of resistance because the peril of 
speaking is hidden from him."228 The Court's opinion in Henry may 
lend some support to this argument when it emphasizes that the 
"mere fact of custody imposes pressure on the accused."229 How-
ever, since the Court does not purport to speak to the issue of "invol-
untariness," that issue remains unresolved.230 
C. Incriminating Statements to Undercover Agents While 
Free on Bail 
In Henry, the Court took pains to limit its holding to cases in 
which the defendant is in custody. Nevertheless, the gloss placed on 
Massiah's "deliberately elicited" test was not limited to this situa-
tion; it would also necessarily apply to situations where an under-
cover agent seeks to testify to incriminating statements made by an 
arraigned or indicted defendant while free on bail. To evaluate the 
impact of Henry's "likely to induce" test in this context, it is appro-
priate to consider two additional hypothetical variations of Henry. 
In the first variation, an informer like Nichols, although indicted for 
a federal o.ff ense, is free on bail and working as a government agent. 
His superior has recently given him the following blanket instruc-
tions: "Naturally, we want any information you can get; but when 
you meet with someone who is indicted or arraigned, you should not 
question him about the charges against him or even initiate conver-
sation relating to that subject." The informer happens to meet a de-
fendant free on bail whom he knew casually at prison, and he 
initiates a conversation about some of their mutual acquaintances. 
This leads into a discussion of these individuals' skill or lack of skill 
as criminals. During the course of the conversation, the informer 
says, "You know, I think the toughest crime to pull off is bank rob-
bery. There's just so much planning that goes into that and so many 
things that can go wrong." The defendant agrees and then, as if to 
illustrate Nichols's point, recounts the details of the bank robbery 
227. See KAMISAR EssAYS at 194; Dix, supra note 174, at 230. 
228. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 606 (1979). 
229. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
230. In view of the Spano decision, the precise circumstances under which the informant 
obtained the incriminating statements might be relevant to a resolution of the voluntariness 
issue. Thus, if the informant exploited a previously existing friendship or directly questioned 
the suspect about the charges against him, rather than merely engaging in conversation calcu-
lated to evoke an incriminating response, the force of the suspect's involuntariness argument 
might be enhanced. 
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which he has recently committed. In the second variation, the facts 
are the same as in the first except that the inform.er makes no com-
ments about bank robbery. The defendant brings up that subject, 
and without any prompting from the inform.er, proceeds to make in-
criminating admissions. 
Based on any reasonable reading of the "likely to induce" test, 
the informer's conduct in the first variation should be found to vio-
late Massiah. In Henry, the Court indicated that in the 'jail-plant" 
context any deceptive tactic which produces a "tug" on the suspect to 
disclose incriminating inf orm.ation will be sufficient to meet the 
"likely to induce" test. Henry is distinguishable from the present 
hypothetical because the defendant is not in custody. However, 
based on Henry's analysis, the· significance of the defenda:q.t's con-
finement is simply that it renders the suspect more likely to "reach 
for aid," thereby increasing the likelihood of an incriminating re-
sponse. Certainly, when the undercover agent's tactic in fact "calls 
for" an incriminating response (in the sense that such a response is a 
natural one) this should more than make up for the absence of the 
supposed psychological e.ff ect of confinement. In the present hypo-
thetical, when the informer comments upon bank robberies, one nat-
ural response from the defendant is to disclose some facts concerning 
the robbery with which he is charged. Whether or not the inform.-
ant's comment was calculated to induce an incriminating re-
sponse,231 it certainly calls for one. Thus, where he is unaware that 
he is dealing with a government agent, the defendant is subject to a 
palpably tangible "tug" to disclose incriminating evidence. Unques-
tionably, this should be sufficient to invoke the sixth amendment.232 
The government's position is stronger in the second variation. 
Although the inform.ant's conduct in this variation exerted no less 
pressure than his conduct in Henry, Henry could be distinguished on 
the ground that there the defendant was in custody and thus, accord-
ing to the Court, more "susceptible to the ploys of government 
agents."233 Henry could be interpreted to mean that when the de-
fendant is in custody, the psychological inducements to confess are 
231. Unless the informer was unaware of the charges against the defendant, the conclusion 
that the remarks were calculated to achieve this end appears inescapable. 
232. The argument for a Massiah violation is much stronger in this case than it would be 
in the hypothetical variation of Innis discussed at notes 195-212 supra, because unlike that 
case, the suspect is unaware that he is dealing with a government agent. With regard to pro-
ducing a "tug" on the suspect to speak, this factor more than outweighs the consideration that 
the suspect in the present hypothetical was not in custody. See Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (suspect "more seriously imposed upon" because he diq not ''know that 
he was under interrogation by a government agent"). -
233. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
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so strong that any government tactic that gains the defendant's confi-
dence will in effect "call for" an incriminating response. The argu-
ment could then be made that Henry should be limited to police 
speech or conduct which "calls for" an incriminating response, and 
that the speech involved in the second variation does not meet this 
test because the defendant's incriminating response was neither nat-
ural nor expected. Thus, while the government may have hoped to 
obtain such a response, the response was essentially "spontaneous" 
and therefore cannot be characterized as "deliberately elicited." 
While this interpretation of Henry is plausible, its implications 
are troubling. First, it would severely complicate criminal litigation. 
Whether the agent's speech or conduct "called for" an incriminating 
response from the defendant would depend on nuances234 that the 
traditional litigation process is poorly equipped to examine.235 
Moreover, to decide cases on this basis would seem to undercut the 
policy underlying the Court's sixth amendment decisions. As previ-
ously noted, 236 the apparent premise of these decisions is that when 
adversary proceedings commence, the defendant is entitled to sub-
stantially the same protection from governmental ejforts to elicit in-
criminating statements as he would have at trial.237 Thus, once the 
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, the government should 
be precluded from all efforts to elicit incriminating statements from 
the defendant in the absence of his attorney. When undercover 
agents engage indicted defendants in conversation, almost inevitably 
their objective is to obtain incriminating statements. To put it an-
other way, they almost always hope to hear something which will tilt 
the balance to the advantage of the government in the coming prose-
cution. Since this is precisely the type of imbalance that the sixth 
amendment is designed to prevent, the most appropriate rule for the 
Court to adopt is that "all post-[arraignment] statements made to 
informers will be suppressed."238 Should it adopt this position in a 
234. The conceivably relevant considerations include the extent of the prior relationship 
between the agent and suspect, the agent's non-verbal co=unications (including his tone of 
voice), and the precise words used in the conversation. 
235. See generally KAMISAR EssAYS at 132-37 (arguing that because the litigation process 
is often incapable of determining the constitutionally relevant facts in confession cases, the 
government should be required to record its efforts to elicit incriminating responses from the 
suspect). 
236. See text at notes 210-11 supra. 
231. See note 230 supra. 
238. 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4174 (suggestion of Stevens, J,, made during the oral argu• 
ment in Henry). Adoption of this rule should lead to the conclusion that incriminating state• 
ments overheard by a "passive" informant who did not participate in the conversation would 
also be excluded. If the government is to be prevented from improperly tilting the adversary 
balance to its own advantage, it should not matter whether the conduct which causes the im-
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future case, the Court will go beyond Henry's holding but not be 
unfaithful to its articulated policy of thwarting governmental "inter-
fere[nce] with the [sixth amendment] right to counsel of the ac-
cused."239 
CONCLUSION 
Innis and Henry are significant not only because they revitalize 
the doctrines of Miranda and Massiah, but also because they consti-
tute a significant first step toward resolving the difficult issues raised 
by indirect and surreptitious police efforts to elicit incriminating 
statements. While the rules the Court applied in Innis and Henry 
are somewhat ambiguous, each rule may be appropriately inter-
preted so as to provide predictable guidance for the police and sig-
nificant protection for suspects in custody who are dealing with · 
either overt or undercover government agents. But even if the Court 
embraces the interpretations of the Innis and Henry rules advocated 
in this Article, cases requiring further refinement of its definition of 
"interrogation" are likely to arise in the not-so-distant future. By 
anticipating three of those cases, this Article helps to trace the still 
hazy limits of interrogation without questions. 
proper tilt is active or passive. In either case, the government has interfered with the sixth 
amendment right of the accused. In any event, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is 
implausible that the litigation process can distinguish between "passive" and "active" infor-
mants. See notes 192 and 235 supra. 
239. United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2188 (1980). 
